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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Notice of Appeal in the instant case was filed with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) \ vhich grants to 1 he I Jtah Supreme Court < >riginal 
appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Coi irt of Appeals does not ha < • e original appellate ji irisdicti.on I he I Jtah Supreme Court then 
transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN, § 78A-3-
102(4) thereby investing the I Jtah Cour I: of Appeals with jurisdiction pursuant to I J I M I CODE 
ANN. §78A-4-l 03(2)(j). 
By its Motion for Summary Disposition filed herein, Appellee DFI Properties, LLC 
("DFI") asserted that this Court lacked jurisdiction and that: instant appeal should be dismissed 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P iA Specifically, DFI asserted that the Judgment entered by the 
District Coin t was i lot a ' • • • i : • M n^^ *- i- tl ie Court's findings of fact concli isions of 
law and imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. The Judgment addressed only the ownership of 
certain real property and authorized the issuance of an Oi dei of R estitution A minute entry, 
which was not signed by the District Court, states: "The court strikes the Defendant's answer and 
counterclaim and enters default against the defendant"' (R. 204),,, 
Numerous Utah cases hold that an unsigned minute entry in not a "final judgment" for 
purposes of appeal. State v. Mace, 921 P.Jd . ; •" • ii 'tali 1996); Swenson Associates Architects, 
P.C. v. State Bv and Through Div. of Facilities Const., 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994); Gallardo v. 
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990); Ahlstrom v» Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 (Utah 1986): Satherv. 
Gross, 727 P2d 212 (I Jtah 1986). • 
This Court denied the Motion for Summary Disposition, deferring its ruling on the issues 
raised in I he Motion pending plenary presenliiliun and eonsii lout ion ot'lhe case. A ruling on the 
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Motion for Summary Disposition may determine that this Court lacks jurisdiction requiring the 
dismissal of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue One: Whether the cumulative conduct of GR2 Enterprises, LLC ("GR2"), which 
included the filing of pleadings purporting to order the District Court to stay its proceedings and 
remove the instant case to another jurisdiction, constitutes a violation of Rule 11 and warrants 
Rule 11 sanctions, specifically the striking of pleadings and the entry of default judgment? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for evaluating the imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions requires a three-tiered approach: (1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and 
(3) the type and amount of sanction imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Archuleta v. Galetka. 197 P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer. 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000); 
Morse v. Packer. 973 R2d 422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992)). 
Issue Two: Whether, in the context of an expedited trial schedule, the District Court 
provided appropriate notice to GR2 and an adequate opportunity to respond so as to comply with 
due process requirements? 
Standard of Review: As part of the three-tiered approach for evaluating the imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions, legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard. 
Archuleta v. Galetka. 197 P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000); 
Morse v. Packer. 973 P.2d 422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992)). 
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Issue Three: Whether the District Court made sufficient findings on the record to allow 
the appellate court to apply the appropriate standards of review? 
Standard of Review: As part of the three-tiered approach for evaluating the imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions, findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; legal 
conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and the type and amount of 
sanction imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, Archuleta v. Galetka, 197 
P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000); Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 
422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutlifl 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992))! 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations 
to court; sanctions* 
(a) Signature. 
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party. 
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as 
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have 
a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a 
notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, 
verified or acknowledged signature and the party electronically files the paper, the 
signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected 
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court 
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is 
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
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opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that 
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose 
an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision 
(b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct 
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but 
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service 
of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged 
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected. If wairranted, the court may award to the party prevailing 
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or 
opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly 
responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and 
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated 
subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct 
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the 
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an 
order directing payment to the amount; of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless 
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement 
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be 
sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order, When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined 
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the 
provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The instant case was commenced by the filing of a Complaint for Eviction by DFI against 
GR2 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County on October 16,2008 (the "Eviction 
Action"). In response to the Complaint for Eviction, GR2 filed an Answer, Counterclaim and 
Request for Jury Trial. DFI requested an expedited trial schedule pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-6-810 which provides that an unlawful detainer trial must be commenced within 60 
days after service of the complaint if the defendant remains in possession of the property. 
Although GR2 requested a regular litigation schedule, it refused to vacate the property 
and the District Court, citing the legislative mandate, scheduled a trial for December 17 and 18, 
2008. The District Court also established discovery parameters and deadlines and a pretrial 
conference was scheduled for December 4. At that conference, the District Court stated that it 
would grant a continuance of the trial if GR2 vacated the property by Friday, December 5, at 6:00 
p.m. and scheduled a review hearing with counsel for Monday, December 8. GR2 did not vacate 
the property by the deadline. 
At the beginning of the telephonic hearing on December 8, the District Court informed 
counsel that three pleadings had been filed in the Eviction Action containing a caption asserting 
the jurisdiction of the First Federal District Court, Western Region, of the Nato Indian Nation: 
1. Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief 
signed by Mr. Juan Antonio Granados 
2. Order for Hearing to Show Cause signed by Judge Henry Clayton 
3. Order to Stay Proceedings signed by Judge Henry Clayton 
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The District Court informed counsel that it would hold a hearing the next day, December 9, to 
consider the applicability of Rule 11 to the recently filed pleadings and gave specific instructions 
to GR2's counsel to deliver written notice to GR2 as to the time and purpose of the hearing, 
including the specific allegations of the District court regarding Rule 11 violations. 
At the December 9 hearing, after questioning GR2 through its representative Mr. 
Granados, the District Court entered its findings on the record and concluded that the conduct of 
GR2 constituted a violation of Rule 11. The District Court imposed sanctions against GR2 
stating that the GR2 pleadings were to be stiicken and default judgment entered against GR2. An 
Order of Restitution was signed by the District Court and immediately served on GR2. 
On December 12,2008 GR2, with new counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and A Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. The District Court scheduled an expedited 
hearing on the Motions for December 23,2008. After hearing oral argument from counsel on 
December 23, the District Court denied both Motions. 
On December 19, 2008, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
appealing the District Court's ruling of December 9, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
GR2 is a Utah limited liability company with two members, Juan Antonio Granados and 
his wife (R. 13, f^ 7). Mr. and Mrs. Granados owned a 27-acre farm in Fillmore, California (the 
"California Property") and decided several years ago to sell it and move to Utah. In 2006, the 
Granados formed GR2, conveyed the California property to the limited liability company and 
began seeking buyers for the California Property. The Granados also began looking for 
residential property to purchase in Utah (R. 13-15, fflj 2-4 J ) . 
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To facilitate the purchase of property in Utah, GR2, working through an independent 
broker, borrowed money from DFI Properties, LLC ("OFF5) (the "Loan") (R. 13,K 5). The Loan 
was evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of ,$1,775,000.00 (the "Note") (R. 13, 
1f 8). To secure payment of the Note, GR2 pledged the California Property and certain Utah 
property located at 480 West 870 South in Orem, Utah (the "Utah Property") which was acquired 
by GR2 with a portion of the Loan proceeds (R. 14, U 6; R. 92-107). 
In 2007, GR2 defaulted under the terms of the Note and in October of 2007 DFI 
commenced foreclosure proceedings against the Utah Property (R. 113). Around this same time, 
GR2 conveyed fractional interests in the California Properly and the Utah Property to certain 
individuals and/or entities, including Marengo Associates and Carpenter Group (R. 11, 
116). These individuals and entities in turn filed serial bankruptcy cases in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California (the "California Bankruptcy Court") 
invoking the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code (R. 65-57; 68-76; 78-85). Even though GR2 
did not file its own bankruptcy case in California, the California Property and the Utah Property 
were protected by the automatic stay in the bankruptcy cases of the various third parties claiming 
small, undivided ownership interests in the properties (Id.). 
Ultimately, the California Bankruptcy Court granted DFI relief from the automatic stay 
with respect to the California Property and the Utah Property (R. 78-85). The California 
Bankruptcy Court Order was entered May 27,2008 and contained a finding that the multiple 
bankruptcy filings were part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors (Id. at 84). 
Further, on June 12,2008 the California Bankruptcy Court, sua sponte, issued an Order to 
Show Cause, "in response to the numerous transfers of fractional interests in real properties to 
entities which then file for Bankruptcy, solely to invoke the automatic stay" (R. 68-76). The 
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Order required Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates and Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group 
to show cause why the Court should not find that the numerous transfers of fractional, undivided 
ownership interests were part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and why an 
omnibus order granting relief from the automatic stay, applicable to all real property interests 
transferred, should not be entered (Id.). 
On July 10,2008, the California Bankruptcy Court entered an In Rem Order on Court's 
Order to Show Cause which annulled the automatic stay as to all real property transferred to Gary 
Barnette dba Marengo Associates or Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group, including the 
California Property and the Utah Property (R. 65-67). The Order provided that the annulment of 
the automatic stay was to be effective for two years from the date of the Order and that any 
creditor having a security interest in any real property held by or in the name of Gary Barnette 
dba Marengo Associates and Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group need not file a motion for 
relief from the automatic stay (Id.). 
Before DFI could schedule and conduct a trustee sale on the Utah Property, GR2, on July 
10, 2008, filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah (the "Utah Bankruptcy Court") (R. 112). DFI filed a Motion to Terminate the Automatic 
Stay relying in part on the Orders from the California Bankruptcy Court. On September 17, 
2008, the Utah Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Granting Relief from Automatic Stay as to the 
Utah Property (R. 61-63) and on October 3,2008, the Utah Property was sold at trustee's sale to 
DFI (R. 3-4). 
On October 10, 2008, DFI filed its Complaint for Eviction against GR2 and Does 1 
through 10 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County; the action from which the 
instant appeal arises (the "Eviction Action") (R. 2-7). On October 21 GR2 filed an Answer, 
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Counterclaim and Jury Demand (R. 9-30). On October 23 DFI filed its Motion for Expedited 
Hearing on Unlawful Detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-810 (R. 33-34). 
Meanwhile, in the pending Utah bankruptcy case of GR2, the bankruptcy trustee, at the 
behest of GR2, filed a Motion to Set Aside Sale with respect to the trustee sale of the Utah 
Property held on October 3,2008, alleging that DFI had not complied with certain notice 
requirements under Utah law (R. 17-18). In response to DFFs Motion for Expedited Hearing in 
the Eviction Action, GR2 filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the State Court arguing that the 
Eviction Action should not move forward until the Utah Bankruptcy Court had ruled on the 
bankruptcy trustee's Motion to set aside the foreclosure sale (R. 42-43). 
At a hearing on November 3, the District Court set an expedited trial date of December 
17, 2008 (R. 291, p. 27:23) and agreed to continue any further proceedings in the Eviction 
Action until after the Utah Bankruptcy Court hearing on the bankruptcy trustee's Motion to Set 
Aside Sale scheduled for November 5, 2008 (R. 291, p. 21:15 - P. 22:5). On November 12, 
2008, the parties presented before the District Court in a follow-up hearing (R. 292). At that 
time, the District Court was informed that the Motion to Set Aside Sale had been denied by the 
Bankruptcy Court (R. 292, p. 3:17-18). Accordingly, the District Court established timelines for 
initial disclosures, discovery, and jury instructions (R. 292, pp. 51-53). 
By Motion dated November 7, 2008, GR2 had requested that the District Court alter the 
expedited trial date from December 17,2008 to February of 2009 and allow the parties more time 
to address the numerous issues raised in GR2Ts Counterclaim (R. 145-146). At the November 12 
hearing, the District Court offered to place the Eviction Action on a conventional litigation 
schedule if GR2 would vacate the Utah Property (R. 292, p. 50:10-14). GR2 refused to vacate 
the Utah Property (R. 292, p. 51:4-5). 
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On November 24, 2008, DFI filed and served a Notice of Deposition for the deposition of 
Mr. Granados for Wednesday, December 3, 2008 (R. 176-177). The deposition did not occur. 
On November 26,2008, Randall L. Jeffs and Liisa A. Hancock of the law firm Jeffs & 
Jeffs filed their Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (R. 178-183). 
On November 26, 2008, DFI served its first set of Requests for Admissions, Request for 
Production of Documents and Interrogatories upon GR2 (R. 184-185). On December 1, 2008, 
DFI filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (R. 186-189). 
At a hearing on December 4, the District Court considered GR2Ts Motion to Alter Trial 
Date and ruled that if GR2 vacated the Utah Property by Friday, December 5 at 6:00 p.m., the 
Court would grant a continuance of the trial (R. 193). GR2 did not vacate the Utah Property by 
the deadline (R. 293, p. 3:4-5). 
On Monday, December 8, three pleadings were filed in the Eviction Action (referred to 
hereinafter as the "Nato Nation Pleadings")(R. 194-202). The first pleading was entitled 
"Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief It was signed 
by Mr. Granados (R. 194-195). The second pleading was entitled "Order for Hearing to Show 
Cause" and was signed by "Judge Henry Clayton". The Order for Hearing to Show Cause 
purported to schedule a hearing of the Eviction Action on December 16, 2008 before the 
Honorable Henry Clayton at a place to be determined (R. 196-197). The third pleading was 
entitled "Order to Stay Proceedings" and was also signed by "Judge Henry Clayton". The Order 
to Stay Proceedings purported to order the District Court to refrain from adjudicating the 
Eviction Action (R. 198-202). The captions of the Nato Nation Pleadings asserted the following 
jurisdiction: "In the First Federal District Court, Western Region, Presiding Judge Henry 
Clayton" (R. 194-202). 
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As it happened, the District Court had previously scheduled a telephonic hearing for 
December 8. During the teleconference, the District Count informed both counsel of the filing of 
the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 293, p. 3:16 - p. 4:5) and indicated that the Court would consider 
the applicability of Rule 11 to the Nato Nation Pleadings at a hearing the next day (R. 293, p. 
6:3-4). The District Court gave specific instructions to GR2's counsel regarding the written 
notice to be provided to GR2 (R. 293, p. 6:3 - 7:2). 
At the December 9 hearing, after questioning GR2 through its representative Mr. 
Granados, the District Court entered its findings and conclusions on the record (R. 294). The 
district Court determined that the conduct of GR2 constituted a violation of Rule 11 and imposed 
sanctions as a consequence of the Rule 11 violation, striking GR2's pleadings and entering 
default judgment GR2 (R. 294). 
The District Court entered Judgment against GR2, finding that DFI was the owner of the 
Utah Property and that it was entitled to possession of the Utah Property (R. 218-223). The 
Judgment also provided that an Order of Restitution would immediately issue requiring GR2 and 
other persons residing in the Utah Property to vacate and deliver possession of the Utah Property 
to DFI within three days (Id.). An Order of Restitution was signed by the District Court and 
immediately served upon GR2 requiring GR2 to turn over possession of the Utah Property to DFI 
(R.294,p.9:13-18). 
On December 12, 2008 GR2, with new counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 
227-228) and A Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment (R. 235-236). At an expedited hearing 
on the Motions on December 23, 2008, and after hearing oral argument from counsel, the District 
Court denied both Motions (R. 295, p. 27:23, p. 28:3-4). 
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On December 19, 2008, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
appealing the District Court's ruling of December 9, 2008 (R. 266-267). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The District Court is afforded great leeway in selecting the type of sanctions to impose 
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Once the District Court has determined the 
relevant facts concerning the offending behavior and has concluded that the offending behavior 
constitutes a violation of Rule 11, it has wide discretion to impose an appropriate sanction that 
will deter the offending behavior. 
The District Court's findings of fact regarding the behavior of GR2, as set forth in the 
record, are not disputed by GR2. Instead, GR2 argues that Rule 11 is inapplicable to its 
offending behavior because Rule 11 applies only to attorneys and unrepresented parties and GR2 
is neither. Rule 11 clearly applies to represented parties: "[Tjhe court may . . . impose an 
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or 
are responsible for the violation." Rule 11(c). 
The cumulative conduct of GR2 constitutes a violation of Rule 11 as a matter of law. 
The District Court determined that GR2 had participated in a pattern of conduct for the improper 
purpose of delaying DATs legal foreclosure efforts, including transferring fractional ownership 
interests in its properties to third parties who in turn filed serial bankruptcy cases in California. 
The California Bankruptcy Court entered two separate Orders finding that the serial bankruptcy 
filings were part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors. The District Court also 
considered GR2's conduct during the Eviction Action. When faced with the filing of the Nato 
Nation Pleadings, which the District Court found were imposed for the purpose of causing 
unnecessary delay and increasing the costs of litigation, the Court determined that the Nato 
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Nation Pleadings were part of GR2's wrongful scheme to delay the enforcement of DATs legal 
rights* 
As a separate legal conclusion, the District Court determined that the Nato Nation 
Pleadings were frivolous and not warranted by existing law. The Nato Nation Pleadings 
purported to strip the District Court of its authority to hear the Eviction Action and ordered its 
appearance at an Order to Show Cause hearing in the First Federal District Court, Western 
Region, Presiding Judge Henry Clayton, of the Nato Indian Nation. This act of blatant defiance 
of the judicial system in general and the District Court in particular, constitutes a violation of 
Rule 11. 
The sanction of striking pleadings and entering default judgment, while not specifically 
mentioned in Rule 11, is clearly available under Rule 11 and can be imposed in appropriate 
circumstances. Further, the District Court's choice of sanctions can only be disturbed if the 
appellate court determines that the choice was an abuse of discretion. In addition, the District 
Court has inherent powers to strike a party's pleadings and enter default judgment where such is 
warranted by a party's wrongful conduct. 
The District Court complied with the requirements of due process in giving GR2 notice of 
the conduct alleged to be a violation of Rule 11 and the possible consequences of that conduct. 
That information was provided to GR2, in writing, by its counsel at the express direction of the 
District Court. GR2 was afforded an opportunity to respond to the Rule 11 allegations; t he 
written notice included the time and place of the hearing scheduled by the District Court to 
consider the sea sponge allegations. 
The hearing was scheduled on one day's notice; the day after the filing of the Nato Nation 
Pleadings. Within the context of the extraordinary circumstances resulting from the expedited 
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trial schedule mandated by Utah law, and GR2's prior conduct in the Eviction Action, the short 
notice was not only reasonable but necessary. GR2 availed itself of the opportunity to respond 
and did, in fact, address the Rule 11 allegations at the December 9 hearing. 
The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered orally on the record, 
are sufficient to enable the appellate application of the three tier standard of review set forth in 
Sutliff and its progeny; but only if this Court determines that the Judgment in the Eviction Action 
is a final order for purposes of the District Court's Rule 11 determinations, and that the pending 
appeal is not moot 
ARGUMENTS 
I, The cumulative conduct of GR2, which included the filing of 
pleadings purporting to order the District Court to stay its 
proceedings and remove the matter to another jurisdiction, 
constitutes a violation of Rule 11 and warrants the imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions, specifically the striking of pleadings and 
the entry of default judgment 
A. The District Court's findings of fact are supported by evidence. 
Before rendering a decision regarding GR2's violation of Rule 11, the District Court 
considered evidence in the record as well as GR2's verbal response to the Court's Order to Show 
Cause at the December 9 hearing. All of the evidence overwhelmingly supports the District 
Court's findings of fact, none of which is disputed by GR2L 
The three Nato Nation Pleadings were the trigger for the District Court to review the 
applicability of Rule 11, but the court relied on other documents in the record as well, 
1. Declaration of Mr, Granados filed in the Utah Bankruptcy Court (R 9-15). The 
Declaration stated that GR2 had transferred undivided fractional interests in the 
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California Property and the Utah Property to individuals and entities "to preserve our 
equity in our properties" (R, 11, f 16). 
2. Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay entered by the California Bankruptcy 
Court on May 27.2008 (R. 78-85). The individuals and entities to whom GR2 
transferred fractional ownership interests, Samuel Andrews, Gary Barnette, Carpenter 
Group, Marengo Associates and Capistrano Enterprises, filed serial bankruptcy cases in 
the California Bankruptcy Court improperly invoking the automatic stay protection for 
the California Property and the Utah Property (R. 84, f 9). This Order was entered in 
Case No. 2:08-11370-AA, in re Samuel Andrews, dba Carpenter Group (R. 85). In the 
Order the California Bankruptcy Court specifically found that the bankruptcy filings were 
"part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors" (R. 84, ^  9).1 
3. Order to Show Cause issued, sea sponge, by the California Bankruptcy Court (R. 
69-76). The Order to Show Cause was issued "in response to the numerous transfers of 
fractional interests in real properties to entities, which then file for bankruptcy, solely to 
invoke the protection of the automatic stay." (R. 76). The Order to show Cause lists 30 
bankruptcy cases involving the transfers of fractional interests, including In re Samuel 
Andrews, Case No. 2:08-11370-AA (R. 75:2). 
4. In Rem Relief Order on Court's Order to Show Cause entered by the California 
Bankruptcy Court on July 10, 2008 (R. 65-67). In this Order, the California Bankruptcy 
Court made a finding that "the real property transfers described in this Court's Order to 
Show Cause are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors." (R. 67). 
Mr. Granados states in his Declaration that he never received any papers from the California Bankruptcy Court 
(R. 10-11,118). However, the Proof of Service by Mail attached to the Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay 
states that a copy of the Order was mailed to Mr. Granados (R. 78-79). 
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The District Court relied on these four pleadings in finding that GR2 had already been 
involved in "devious" conduct in attempting to avoid the DAI foreclosure. (R. 295, p. 30:18-22). 
The filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was a continuation of GR2's delay tactics and the District 
Court found that they were filed specifically to derail the scheduled trial (R. 295, p. 31:19-22). 
As further support for the finding that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was for the 
improper purpose of delay, the District Court analyzed the timing of the filing on December 8. 
This was not an ordinary case but was being conducted on an expedited basis as required by the 
Utah unlawful detainer statutes (R. 295, p. 30:24-25). The Court found that GR2 was trying to 
derail the Court's ability to follow a legislative mandate (R. 295, p. 31:11-12) and that it was 
"especially egregious" that the specific purpose of filing the Nato Nation Pleadings was to derail 
the trial that was scheduled less than 10 days away (R. 295, p. 31:19-22). 
Finally, the District Court considered the content of the Nato Nation Pleadings, 
particularly the language purporting to order a stay of the proceedings in the District Court. The 
District Court was concerned that the Nato Nation Pleadings constituted a violation of the 
Criminal Code of the State of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-513; specifically the crime of 
false judicial or official notice (R. 294, p .8)} But beyond that, the District Court found that 
there was no reasonable basis to believe that the Nato Nation Pleadings were anything other than 
frivolous and that they had been submitted for the sole purpose of delay (R. 294, p 8:8-12). 
All of the evidence supports the District Court's findings that GR21s conduct was 
egregious and that the Nato Nation Pleadings were frivolous, not warranted by existing law and 
Section 76-8-513 provides: A person is guilt/ of a class B misdemeanor who, with a purpose to procure the 
compliance of another with a request made by the person, knowingly sends, mails, or delivers to the person a notice or 
other writing which has no judicial or other sanction but which in its format or appearance simulates a seal, or printed 
form of a federal, state or local government or an instrumentality thereof, or is otherwise calculated to induce a belief 
that it does have a judicial or other official sanction. 
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were filed for an improper purpose; delaying the expedited trial and needlessly increasing the 
costs of litigation. The Nato Nation Pleadings were a blatant attempt to defy and disrespect the 
authority of the District Court. GR2, through its representative Mr. Granados, clearly intended to 
subvert the jurisdiction of the District Court in an effort to avoid the trial on December 17 and 
maintain its possession of the Utah Property. 
In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the District Court's findings of fact, those 
findings can be disturbed only if they are against the "clear" or "great" weight of the evidence. 
Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174,1175 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 
P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989). In this case, there is a total lack of evidence to support any 
findings other than those stated on the record by the District Court. 
B. The conduct of GR2 constitutes a violation of Rule 11 as a 
matter of law. 
In determining what constitutes a violation of Rule 11, one must look first to the language 
of the rule. The applicable portion of Rule 11(b) states: 
(b) Representations to the court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law;. . . 
As detailed in subsection A., supra, the District Court found that the Nato Nation 
Pleadings had been presented for the improper purposes of delay and needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. However, GR2 asserts in Appellant's Brief that it cannot be held responsible 
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for its conduct under Rule 11 because Rule 11 (b) applies only to attorneys and unrepresented 
parties and GR2 was represented by counsel at the time the Nato Nation Pleadings were filed. 
This argument completely ignores the language of Rule 11 (c): u[T]he court may impose 
an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible 
for the violation" (emphasis added). In the instant case there is no dispute that GR2, through Mr. 
Granados, was responsible for filing the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 294, p. 3:15-17). GR2 went 
outside the rules governing civil proceedings and filed its own pleadings, even though it had 
obtained counsel to represent it in the Eviction Action. 
Where a represented party is responsible for a violation of Rule 11, the court may 
sanction that party under Rule 11. Union Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378,384-
385 (6th Cir. 1997). See also. Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277,1293-1294 
(1lthCir.2002) (affirming imposition of sanction enjoining plaintiff from filing future actions 
against defendant when monetary sanctions were found to be insufficient deterrent); Fries v. 
Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7thCir. 1998) (court imposed sanctions on party and his counsel for 
filing claims that were frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation and asserted 
for an improper purpose); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 (E.D.Cal. 
1992) (party represented by counsel sanctioned by striking answer and counterclaim and entering 
default judgment where there was pattern of delay and obvious disregard for court's authority). 
If GR2's interpretation of Rule 11 were adopted, the very purpose of the rule would be 
defeated. GR2 cannot insulate itself from the requirements of Rule 11 by hiring counsel, 
refusing to avail itself of the advise and assistance of counsel, and then acting on its own in an 
improper manner. Interestingly, none of the five arguments propounded by GR2 in Appellant's 
Brief address the nature of GR2's conduct. Absent reliance on the specious argument that a 
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represented party can act with impunity, GR2 would have to defend its actions on the merits 
which, DAI asserts, cannot be done. 
GR2fs reliance on the Vermont case, Agency of NEitural Resources v. Lvndonville 
Savings Bank & Trust Co.. 811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001) is misplaced. First, it is not clear whether 
the Vermont version of Rule 11 contained the same language as Utah Rule 11(c) which 
specifically allows the imposition of sanctions upon a represented party. Second, the ruling of 
the Vermont court, denying the motion for sanctions, was based upon the fact that the offending 
papers were dismissed within the safe harbor period of Rule 11. Accordingly, the court's 
language limiting the applicability of Rule 11 is simply dicta. Third, the Vermont court's dicta 
does not provide precedent or even helpful direction for the Utah courts. 
In another misguided attempt to insulate GR2 from the legal consequences of its actions, 
Appellant's Brief argues that Mr. Granados cannot act for GR2 in the case because he is not an 
attorney and because GR2 cannot act in a pro se capacity. In filing the Nato Nation Pleadings, 
Mr. Granados was not purporting to act as GR2's counsel. He was acting as an agent of GR2, in 
his capacity as a member/manager of a limited liability company, which is the only way a 
corporate entity can take action. Mr. Granados' statements at the December 9 hearing were not 
made as a legal representative of GR2 but were in response to the District Court's questions 
directed to a party, GR2; in the nature of questioning a witness. While Mr. Granados cannot 
provide legal representation to GR2, he can certainly act in a representative capacity on behalf of 
GR2 in answering questions and causing GR2 to take actions, including the filing of the Nato 
Nation Pleadings. 
Where the District Court has made findings with respect to the conduct of a party, 
specifically; that pleadings were filed for the improper purpose of delaying an expedited trial; 
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that the filing of the pleadings was a continuation of a devious plan to avoid foreclosure and the 
loss of the Utah Property; and that the pleadings were frivolous and attempted to usurp the 
authority of the District Court; a conclusion that this conduct constitutes a violation of Rule 11 is 
correct, as a matter of law. 
C. The sanctions imposed by the District Court are appropriate 
and not an abuse of discretion* 
Rule 11(c) specifically states that the court "may impose an appropriate sanction", Utah 
case law interprets this language as providing great leeway to trial courts in allowing them to 
tailor sanctions under Rule 11 to fit the requirements of a specific case. Bailey-Allen Co, Inc. v. 
Kurzet 945 P.2d 180,195 (Utah CtApp. 1997); R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 
936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
In determining an appropriate sanction, a court should keep in mind the purpose of Rule 
11 sanctions which is to "deter baseless filings and curb abuses." Business Guides, Inc. v. 
Chromatic Communications Enterprises. Inc.. 498 U.S. 533, 553,111 S.Ct 922, 934, 112 
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991). To that end, Rule 11 creates wide parameters for a trial court faced with 
determining an appropriate sanction. The only applicable limiting language3 in Rule 11 is 
subsection (c)(2): "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is 
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." 
The District Court carefully considered other options before ordering that GR2Ts 
pleadings be stricken and default judgment entered against it. But the Court concluded that 
lesser sanctions, such as an admonition or awarding attorneys' fees, would not cure the 
Rule 11(c)(2)(A) sets one other limit not applicable in the instant case. Monetary sanctions cannot be awarded 
against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2);Le., presenting a pleading, written motion or other paper 
to the court where the claims, defenses and other legal contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 
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significant problem created by GR2's conduct (R. 295, p. 31:14-19). Further, the Court 
determined that GR2fs egregious conduct interfered with the orderly presentation of matters in 
the court and undermined the judicial system and therefore justified the imposition of a harsh 
sanction (R. 295, p. 31:23-25 and p. 32:1-3). 
GR2 asserts that the District Court's decision to strike pleadings and enter default 
judgment is not an authorized sanction under Rule 11 and that there is no precedent for such a 
sanction under Utah law. Where there is no Utah precedent with respect to an aspect of Rule 11, 
it is appropriate to look to cases and authorities interpreting Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is substantially similar to the Utah rule. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 
1993 Amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that dismissal is 
clearly contemplated as a sanction: 
[T]his restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions 
or remedial orders that may have collateral financial consequences 
upon a party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, 
or preparation of an amended pleading. 
While there may not be a Utah case directly addressing this issue, federal courts have 
concluded that the choices available to trial courts under Rule 11 include striking pleadings and 
entering default judgment against an offending party. Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co,, 307 F.3d 
1277, 1293-1294 (1 lthCir.2002) (affirming imposition of sanction enjoining plaintiff from filing 
future actions against defendant); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria. 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 
(E.D.Cal.1992) (party represented by counsel sanctioned by striking answer and counterclaim 
and entering default judgment where there was pattern of delay and obvious disregard for court's 
authority). 
523562.3 21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
GR2 argues, citing the Bailey-Allen case, 945 P.2d at 990, that the normal sanction for a 
Rule 11 violation is recovery of attorneys' fees. However, the instant case is anything but 
normal. The District Court found the conduct of GR2, within the context of an expedited 
schedule mandated by Utah law, to be "extraordinary" (R. 295, p. 27:20; R. 295, p. 30:24). The 
District Court described the circumstances as exceptional: 
So in totality, I will freely admit and acknowledge that this, these are exceptional 
circumstances and that typically, if this had been a case where we were months 
out from trial, I would have looked to a lesser sanction. But given the timing of 
this case and the what I believe blatant attempt there was here to derail a trial 
setting, I am going to stick with the ruling that I made. 
(R. 295, p. 33:3-9). 
In Jimenez v, Madison Area Technical College. 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh 
Circuit considered a case of first impression regarding dismissal as a Rule 11 sanction. The 
Court deftly described the situation as follows: 
We recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction. Thus, we understand 
why we have uncovered no prior instance in which this Court has 
reviewed such an obvious and serious Rule 11 sanction for an abuse of 
discretion. Nonetheless, it is proper for the trial court to impose a 
severe sanction where the sanction is sufficient to deter repetition of the 
misconduct or to deter similar conduct by third parties. 
Id. at 657. 
The Jimenez Court affirmed the trial court's sanction of dismissal of the case, stating that 
the sanction "[met] the requisite criteria in this case, given the egregious nature of Jimenez's 
conduct. Jimenez's claim was so unmeritorious and her behavior so deceptive that the filing of 
her baseless claim amounted to a veritable attack on our system of justice.55 Id. 
The District Court made similar findings in the instant matter. GR2's conduct interfered 
with the orderly presentation of matters in the state court and was an attempt to undermine the 
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judicial system. (R. 295, p. 31:23-25 and p. 32:1-3). The District Court also concluded that a 
lesser sanction would not deter similar conduct by GR2. In order to maintain the integrity of its 
courtroom administration and the judicial system as a whole, the District Court determined to 
strike GR2's pleadings and enter default judgment 
All of GR2's prior conduct, together with the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings on the 
eve of trial, which pleadings defied the authority of the District Court and purported to order the 
District Court to stay its proceeding, warrant the severe sanctions imposed. In reviewing the 
District Court's decision as to the sanction chosen and imposed, this Court need only determine 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
sanctions of striking pleadings and entering default judgment, while severe, are appropriate and 
well within the bounds of discretion to be exercised by the District Court. 
D. The District Court has inherent power to strike pleadings and 
enter default judgment to ensure the orderly administration of 
justice and the integrity of its Orders. 
It is well established that courts have inherent power to levy sanctions in response to 
abusive litigation practices and those sanctions include the striking of pleadings and the entry of 
default judgment. Roadway Express. Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 
65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has considered the scope of inherent judicial 
power and in Chen v. Stewart. 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005), established the parameters of a trial 
court's inherent power in the context of allegations of criminal contempt. 
The Chen opinion states that a court's authority to enter sanctions can be both statutory 
and inherent. Id. at 427. See also. Chambers v. NASACO Inc.. 501 U.S. 32, 49,111 S.Ct 2123, 
115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (the inherent power of the court can be invoked even if procedural rules 
exist which sanction the same conduct). While a court's authority to hold a person in contempt 
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and enter sanctions is circumscribed by due process requirements, in appropriate circumstances 
the striking of pleadings and the entry of default judgment is within the bounds of a court's 
inherent power. 
In sum, a court has the inherent authority to strike a party's pleadings 
and enter a default judgment if the party engages in conduct designed to 
improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of the case, 
such as perjury or obstruction of justice, or if the conduct itself tends to 
demonstrate bad faith or a lack of merit. 
Chen, 123 P.3d at 429, 
In the instant case, GR2rs conduct was in the nature of contempt. In particular, the 
District Court found that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was for an improper purpose: 
preventing the Court from conducting the legislatively mandated unlawful detainer trial In filing 
the Nato Nation Pleadings, GR2 mocked the authority of the District Court as well as the state 
judicial system. GR2 scorned the District Court's Orders and attempted to interfere with the 
Court's ability to promote the efficient administration of justice. GR2*s conduct, taken as a 
whole, shows bad faith and gives rise to a reasonable inference that its claims are without merit. 
The District Court found GR2's conduct to be "egregious" and that the particular 
circumstances of the case were "extraordinary". This, together with the District Court's other 
findings, clearly support the Court's invoking its inherent power as an alternate basis for 
imposing sanctions on GR2. 
II. Whether, in the context of an expedited trial schedule, the District 
Court provided GR2 with appropriate notice and an opportunity to 
respond so as to comport with due process? 
Before imposing sanction on a party under Rule 11, due process requires that the party 
receive adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. This requirement, however, does not 
necessitate a formal evidentiary hearing, but rather, it is sufficient if the party is given an 
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opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing. Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah. 
31 P.3d 543 (Utah 2001). Further, in considering whether GR2 was afforded due process, this 
Court must look at the specific circumstances which were in play at the time the questioned 
notice took place. "[D]ue process is a flexible concept and the particular procedural protections 
vary, depending upon all the circumstances." Id. (quoting Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738, 743 
(Utah Q. App. 1997). 
The instant case began with an Eviction Action filed by DFI against GR2 to obtain 
possession of the Utah Property after it was purchased at f Dreclosure sale on October 2, 2008. 
Because GR2 remained in possession of the Utah Property, the District Court was required to 
conduct a trial on the matter within 60 days of the service of the complaint. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-6-810. It is within the context of this expedited schedule that this Court must determine 
whether GR2 was afforded appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
On November 12, 2008, the District Court set a trial date of December 17 and established 
an expedited schedule for discovery and other pretrial matters. The offending Nato Nation 
Pleadings were filed with the District Court on December 8, 2008, less than 10 days before the 
scheduled trial and only two days before jury instructions were to be filed. Prior to that date, 
GR2 had filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings, which was denied, GR2, through its representative 
Mr. Granados, had failed to appear for a properly scheduled deposition after it had been 
rescheduled at GR2's request, GR2 had filed a Motion to Alter Trial Date seeking to postpone the 
December 17 trial to February of 2009, which was denied; and GR2's counsel had filed a Motion 
to Withdraw as Counsel. 
With that backdrop, and faced with an impending trial date, the District Court had little 
choice but to address, as quickly as possible, the Nato Nation Pleadings which purported to usurp 
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the court's authority to administer its case and conduct a trial. Accordingly, at a scheduled 
hearing on December 8, which, by coincidence was the date of the filing of the Nato Nation 
Pleadings, the District Court, sua sponte, issued on the record an Order to Show Cause and 
scheduled a hearing to consider the issues raised therein for the next day at 2:30 p.m. 
The District Court clearly set out the allegations regarding the alleged violation of Rule 
11: that the Nato Nation Pleadings were filed for an improper purpose, to unnecessarily delay the 
Eviction Action and to needlessly increase the costs of the litigation; that the contentions set 
forth in the Nato Nation Pleadings were not warranted by existing law; and that the Nato Nation 
Pleadings were frivolous (R. 293, p. 6:11-16). The District Court also required counsel for GR2 
to deliver a letter to GR2 giving it notice of the December 9 hearing and including the allegations 
of the Court relating to the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 293, p. 6:3-6). Further, the District Court 
specifically stated that it was considering imposing the sanctions of striking all of GR2's 
pleadings and entering default judgment against it, giving GR2 notice of the seriousness of the 
matter and the possible consequences (R. 293, p. 4:14-17). 
While one day's notice, in the abstract, may be unreasonable, under the existing 
circumstances it was not only reasonable but necessary. Without a resolution of the Rule 11 
allegations, the Court and DFI were in an untenable position. The Court was required to conduct 
a trial within 60 days per legislative mandate. To keep that schedule would require DFI to 
expend considerable money and resources to prepare for trial. If the Court set a hearing on the 
Rule 11 issues in five days, or even three days, DFI would have no choice but to prepare for trial, 
not knowing what the outcome of the Court's Order to Show Cause might be. In that situation, 
the District Court's decision to hold a hearing the next day was not only reasonable, it was the 
only responsible decision to be made. 
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GR2 was given an adequate opportunity to respond to the Rule 11 allegations as required 
by Utah law. In Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court expounded 
upon the specific procedural protections that must be afforded prior to the imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions. The opinion instructs that affording a party the right to respond does not require an 
adversarial, evidentiary hearing. Due process is satisfied if the trial court gives the party against 
whom sanctions are to be imposed an opportunity to file a brief or otherwise respond. "[T]he 
accused must be given an opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing, to justify his or her 
actions." Id., (citing Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5A Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1337, at 129 (2d ed.1990)). 
GR 2, by and through its member/manager, Mr. Granados, had the opportunity to address 
the District Court regarding the Rule 11 allegations and in fact did address them at the December 
9 hearing. Waiting two or three days or even a week would not have changed the fact the Mr. 
Granados acknowledged signing and submitting the Nato Nation Pleadings. The other evidence 
considered by the District Court was already part of the record; again, something that would 
remain the same on December 16 as it was on December 9. 
Within the context of an statutorily mandated expedited schedule, the District Court's 
notice of one day to respond to the Rule 11 allegations was appropriate and afforded GR2 the 
necessary procedural protections required by due process. 
IH. Whether the District Court made sufficient findings on the 
record to allow the appellate court to apply the appropriate 
standards of review? 
When imposing sanctions, a court must describe the conduct determined to constitute a 
violation of Rule 11 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. Rule 11(c)(3). "[TJhere 
should be findings on the record or other appropriate explanation of the trial court's rationale that 
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will enable the appellate courts to apply the SutlifF standard. Morse v. Packer. 973 P.2d 422,425 
(Utah 1999). 
Unfortunately, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal before the District Court had an 
opportunity to finalize and enter its findings of fact, conclusions of law and written Order. Such 
a document would surely be more precise and allow for a less burdensome review.4 However, 
Rule 11 does not mandate a written order and the District Court record provides the necessary 
findings and conclusions to be reviewed by this Court. The record contains a statement of the 
evidence supporting the District Court's finding that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was 
for improper purposes; unnecessary delay and needless increase of costs of litigation. The 
District Court also explains its finding that the Nato Nation Pleadings were frivolous and without 
basis in existing law, and its conclusion that GR2's conduct constituted a violation of Rule 11. 
With respect to its choice of sanctions, there is ample explanation in the transcripts 
regarding the District Court's consideration of lesser sanctions and the reasoning behind its 
decision that only the striking of pleadings and entry of default judgment would be an effective 
deterrent in this case. 
GR2 cites Crocket v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co,. 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1996), 
to support its assertion that the District Court's findings are inadequate. However, Crocket is 
inapposite to the instant case. In the Crocket case, the Court determined that a single finding was 
insufficient to support the imposition of sanctions because it precluded the appellate court from 
determining what conduct was being judged and the basis for the trial court's imposition of 
sanctions. Id. at 231. 
The jurisdictional aspects of the lack of a written order are discussed in the section entitled "Statement of 
Jurisdiction", supra. 
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At the Rule 11 hearing, held December 9,2008, and again during the December 23, 2008 
hearing for GR 2's Motion to Set Aside the Order, the District Court spent considerable time and 
in considerable detail, entered its findings and conclusions on the record. Section I. of 
Appellee's Brief, supra, sets forth the specific citations to these findings and conclusions. The 
record in this case, including pleadings and transcripts, provides a sufficient basis to enable this 
Court to apply the Sutliff standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In entering sanctions against GR2, the District Court carefully considered the evidence, 
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, and imposed an appropriate 
sanction under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the District Court is 
imbued with the inherent power to enter appropriate sanctions to ensure the orderly 
administration of justice and maintain the integrity of its Orders. 
GR2 was afforded notice of the scope and purpose of the Rule 11 hearing and an 
opportunity to respond at the hearing. The timing and nature of the notice were reasonable under 
the extraordinary circumstances faced by the District Court. 
WHEREFORE, DFI Properties, LLC, respectfully requests this Court to deny GR2's 
appeal in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted this<JL day of August, 2009. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Carolyn Montgomery 
Thomas B. Price 
Attorneys for Appellee DFI Propfo/iies, LLC 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Judgment entered by the District Court, December 9,2008 (R. 218-223) 
2. Order of Restitution executed by the District Court (R. 214-216) 
3. Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief 
captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western Region of the Ministry of Justice, 
Nato Indian Nation (R. 194-195) 
4. Order for Hearing to Show Cause captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western 
Region of the Ministry of Justice, Nato Indian Nation (R. 196-197) 
5. Order to Stay Proceedings captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western Region 
of the Ministry of Justice, Nato Indian Nation (R. 198-202) 
6. Declaration of Juan Antonio Granados filed in the Utah Bankruptcy Court (R. 9-15) 
7. Order Granting Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay entered by California 
Bankruptcy Court (R. 78-85) 
8. Order to Show Cause entered by the California Bankruptcy Court (R. 68-76) 
9. In Rem Order on Order to Show Cause entered by trie California Bankruptcy Court(R. 
65-66) 
10. Transcript of Hearing; December 8,2008 (R. 293) 
11. Transcript of Hearing; December 9,2008 (R. 294) 
12. Transcript of Hearing; December 23,2008 (R. 295) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 




GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 080103867 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, the Answer and 
Counterclaim of Defendant having been stricken pursuant to this Court's Order dated 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of 
Plaintiff, DPI Properties, LLC and against Defendants, GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and John 
Does 1 through 10 as follows: 
1. DFI Properties, LLC is the owner and entitled to possession of the real 
property located at 480 West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and more 
particularly described as: 
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B", 
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
2. An Order of Restitution shall immediately issue in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, requiring Defendants GR 2 Enteiprises and Does 1 through 10, those 
persons who may be residing at the Property by or through GR 2 Enterprises' possession 
of the Property, to vacate and deliver possession of the Property to DFI Properties, LLC 
within three (3) calendar days following service of the Order of Restitution, 
3. This Judgment may be supplemented, upon the presentation of appropriate 
evidence, by an award of damages to Plaintiff resulting from Defendants' unlawful 
detainer and any waste of the Property during Defendants' possession of the Property. 
The total amount awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to this Paragraph shall be three (3) times 
the amount of actual damages assessed. 
4. This Judgment may be supplemented, upon the filing of an Affidavit by 
counsel for Plaintiff, in an amount equal to the reasonable attorney fees incurred by 
Plaintiff. 
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5. Pursuant to 78B-6-811(4), this Judgment shall be issued and enforced 
immediately and execution upon the Judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry 
of the Judgment , 
OK 
DATED this ' *~day of December, 2008. 
BYTHE COURT 
Judge David N. Mo^teiis^^v^;^?! 
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Carolyn Montgomery (2297) 
Thomas B.Price (8254) 
Zions Bank Building 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127 
WOODALL & WASSERMANN 
James H. Wbodall (5361) 
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Telephone: (801) 254-9450 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
DFI PROPERTIES, LLC, a California Limited 
Liability Company, ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 080103867 
vs. Judge David N. Mortensen 
GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
On December , 2008, Judgment was entered by this Court against 
Defendants GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, ordering that GR 2 
Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, within three (3) calendar days following 
515149.1 0219 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
service of this Order, vacate and deliver possession of the real property located at 480 
West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and mote particularly described as: 
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B", 
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
L Defendants shall vacate the Property, remove all personal property, and 
restore possession of the Property to the Plaintiff, DFI Properties, LLC within three (3) 
calendar days following service of this Order, or be forcibly removed by the sheriff or 
constable. 
2. Defendants have the right to a hearing to contest the manner of the 
enforcement of this Order of Restitution pursuant to the form to request a hearing served 
concurrently with this Order. 
3. If Defendants fail to comply with this Order within the time prescribed 
. herein, the sheriff or constable may enter the Property by force using the least destructive 
means possible to remove the Defendants. 
4. Any personal property of the Defendants may be removed from the 
Property by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location for safe storage. 
DATED this day of December, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
2 A Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CALLISTERNEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Carolyn Montgomery (2297) 
Thomas B. Price (8254) 
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10 East South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127 
WOODALL & WASSERMANN 
James H. Woodall (5361) 
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Telephone: (801) 254-9450 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 




GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
On December Judgment was entered by this Court against 
Defendants GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, ordering that GR 2 
Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, within three (3) calendar days following 
RUHB -
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Cft&R COUNT? 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
Civil No. 080103867 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
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service of this Order, vacate and deliver possession of the real property located at 480 
West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and more particularly described as: 
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B", 
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants shall vacate the Property, remove all personal property, and 
restore possession of the Property to the Plaintiff, DFI Properties, LLC within three (3) 
calendar days following service of this Order, or be forcibly removed by the sheriff or 
constable. 
2. Defendants have the right to a hearing to contest the manner of the 
enforcement of this Order of Restitution pursuant to the form to request a hearing served 
concurrently with this Order, 
3« If Defendants fail to comply with this Order within the time prescribed 
herein, the sheriff or constable may enter the Property by force using the least destructive 
means possible to remove the Defendants. 
4. Any personal property of the Defendants may be removed from the 
Property by die sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location for safe storage. 
DATED this of December, 2008. 
Judge ^ Bavid N. MdijenseEr 
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 





• > J 
) REQUEST FOR HEARING 
> Case No. 
I object to the terms of the Order of Restitution or the manner in which the Order of Restitution was enforced 
for the following reasons (check all that apply): 
[ ] I was not personally;*served with a copy of the Order of Restitution, nor was a copy of the Order of 
Restitution mailed to me and posted on the premises. < 
[ ] I was not given the time period ordered by the court to voluntarily vacate the premises, 
[ ] My properly is not being stored in a suitable place and/oir in a reasonable manner. 
[ ] The removal and storage costs charged to me are unreasonable. 
[ ] I was not provided with a copy of the inventory of the property- removed. 
[ ] Although I demanded return of my property within 30 days of the date it was removed, and although I 
paid all costs associated with its removal and storage, my property was not returned. 
[ ] A written notice of the time and place of sale of my property was not mailed to me. 
{ ] I attended the sale of my property. However, the remainder of my property was not released to me 
after the costs of removal, storage, advertising and conducting the sale were recovered. 
[ ] I did not attend the sale of my property. The remaining proceedis of the sale were not returned to me 
after deducting the costs of removal, storage, advertising and conducting the sale and paying plaintiff"s 
judgment against me. 
[ ] I am not the defendant. I delivered a written demand for the release of my property to the constable 
or sheriff, and provided proper identification and evidence of ownership, but my property was not returned. 
[ ] Other: 
The statements made in this Request For Hearing are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
I mailed or delivered a copy of this Request For Hearing to: [ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant. 
DATE: SIGNATURE: 
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First Federal District Coi 
Western Region, 'Nato Indian Nation 
P.OBox141 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Office: (801) 808-1497 
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com 
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Juan Antonio Granados 
v. 
DFI Funding, Inc. and 
DFI Properties, LLC 
S& 
PETITION FOR HEARING TO &JQW . 
CAUSE, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS ANQP| 
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF , 
Case No. 
Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner Juan Antonio Granados, a Kickapoo indigenous 
person and citizen of 'Nato Indian Nation, by and through the FIRST FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT WESTERN REGION, by this Petition requests a hearing before the 
court to Show Cause and why Declaratory Relief of pending action in the 4th District 
Court in the State of Utah Civil No. 080103867 and pending action in the Superior Court] 
of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil, Case No. 56-2008-000331977CL-VD-
VDA, should not be granted and any or all other relief as seems proper and necessary 
for issues to be presented before the court, 
BY THE PETITIONER: 
Dated this 8th day of December, 2008 
5lian/ 
 Antonio Granados, Petitioner 
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The undersigned hereby rtifies that they caused a true and' rect copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR HEARING TO SHOW CAUSE, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF to be delivered to the following: 
ADDRESS NAME 
4th District Court of Utah 
Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil 
Kimball, Tirey and St. John 
Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq. 
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough 
James H. Woodall 
Woodall & Wassermann 
Mr. Randall L. Jeffs 
Dated £tec- &- a§ 
350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
10 E.S. Temple #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84113 
10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
90 N. 100 E. 
P.O Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Juan Antonio Granados, Petitioner 
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First Federal District Cor 
Western Region, 'Nato Indian Nation 
P.O Box 141 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Office: (801) 808-1497 
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com 
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IN RE, 
Juan Antonio Granados, 
Petitioner 
v. 
DFI Funding, Inc. and 
DFI Properties, LLC 
Defendants 
ORDER FOR HEARINGS' 





Case No. UT081208CIVIL 
Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton 
COMES NOW, the FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN REGION, 
having received Petition and evidence, finds that Petitioner, having authority under color] 
of tribal custom/law, Federal Indian Law and International Rights of Indigenous Peoples,) 
is certified though comity, reciprocity and superior jurisdiction (Indian Law is Federal 
Law) able to bring this cause of action before the court, therefore this court has proper 
venue and jurisdiction. 
Said entitled case to be heard before the Honorable Henry Clayton Presiding 
Judge on the 16th of December 2008 at a time and place to be determined. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dated jmis 8th &w of December, 2008 
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The undersigned hereby^  rtifies that they caused a true and ('•• rect copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR HEARING TO SHOW CAUSE to be delivered to the following: 
ADDRESS NAME 
4th District Court of Utah 
Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil 
Kimball, Tirey and St. John 
Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq. 
Callister, Nebeker & McCu Hough 
James H. Woodall 
Woodall & Wassermann 
Mr. Randall L. Jeffs 
Dated ; jTgc_ ff- 6ff Q fu 
350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
10 E. S. Temple #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84113 
10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
90 N. 100 E. 
P.OBox888 
Provo, UT 84603 
an Antonio Granados, Petitioner 
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P.O Box 141 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Office: (801) 808-1497 
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com 
TIED 
m 0 6 ?0d8 
*t&£p Indian Nation 






Juan Antonio Granados 
v. 
DFI Funding, Inc. and 
DFI Properties, LLC 
V77* ST 
ORDER TO STAY MS-
PROCEEDINGS 
Case No. UT081208CIVIL 
Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton 
€1* 
COMES NOW, the FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN REGION, 
having received Petition and evidence and having authority under color of tribal 
custom/law, Federal Indian Law and International Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is 
certified though comity, reciprocity and superior jurisdiction (Indian Law is Federal Law) 
able to bring this cause of action before the court, therefore this court has proper venue 
and jurisdiction of pending action in the 4th District Court in the State of Utah Civil No. 
080103867 and pending action in the Superior Court of California, County of 
Ventura/Limited Civil, Case No. 56-2008-000331977CL-VD-VDA. 
The court hereby, grants to Petitioner a TEMPORARY STAY of pending actions 
in the before mentioned styled cases in order to seek equitable remedy as is provided 



























for within tribal custom/lr Federal Indian Law and Internatio' ' Indigenous Rights 
Law. 
Tribal courts are traditionally non-adversarial in nature and practice, while 
maintaining an atmosphere of equity between all parties involved in disputes between 
Indian to Indian while at the same time have continuously become more concentrated in( 
disputes with Indian to non-Indian over property and the jurisdiction involved with the 
possession of same-
Traditionally tribal courts have lacked the funding to exercise tribal legal matters 
that extend beyond their natural borders. In the past fifteen years such has not been 
the case with the exercise of the First Federal District Court provided by 'Nato Indian 
Nation to various other tribal nations in Canada, the United States and Mexico. 
In 1994 Congress passed Public Law 103-263, section 5(b), paragraphs (f) and 
(g) referred to as the "Privileges and Immunities of Indian Tribes; Prohibition on New 
Regulations" and "Privileges and immunities of Indian Tribes; Existing Regulations". 
These regulations prohibited the misuse of Congressional, Departmental or Regulatory 
powers to classify, enhance, or diminish the privileges or immunities of the various 
tribes by Government or by other tribes relative to each other. 
Further, basic Federal Indian law constructs have been adopted to protect the 
sovereign immunity of indigenous peoples and have been in place for decades. For 
example, "Law doctrines from other fields of law cannot be imposed upon Indian law, 
legal doctrines must often be viewed from a different perspective from that which would 
obtain m other areas of law"; "Standard principles of statutory construction do not have 
their usual force in cases involving Indian law", and more importantly "State law 
definition of terms cannot be used to frustrate statues". 
While the basic constructs provide a guide there are more specific case history to| 
provide legal footprints relating to jurisdiction. For instance, in Alberty v. United States, 
the object of the ruling pertained to the meaning of the words "sole" or only "parties", 
0 m 
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obviously there were vaf s ways to interpret the definition. '' i court ruled that 
Congresses intent was to exclude white men and persons of other nations (Indian) with 
respect to civil litigation as "the more probable construction". 
Further, in Lower Brule v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co. Inc., the court 
decided that "Tribal courts are primary and exclusive forum for disputes regarding tribal 
government issues and for interpretation of tribal laws", and in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 
Mont/Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, "Tribal courts can also be the forum for civil 
disputes even between Indians and non-Indians". 
Now, as pertaining to the State courts and Indian courts, Indian courts have a 
long established history as to their status to bring individual members or citizens of their 
nation before a traditional form of remedy. In the case of Pittsburgh & Midway Coal 
Mining Co. v. Watchman, "Tribal courts remedies must be exhausted before issue may 
be considered by federal court". Such a ruling places the burden of resolution squarely 
with Indian court jurisdiction. 
Most recently, these issues have come before the body of the United Nations in 
relation to Indigenous Rights. The 'United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
indigenous Peoples" was passed last September 12th 2007. The issues heretofore 
delineated can be found in the following sections of this document as approved in 
General Session: 
Article 8 Section 2 paragraphs (a) and (b); Article 9; Article 10; Article 13 Section 2; 
Article 18; Article 20 Section 2; Article 26 Sections 1, 2, and 3; Article 27; Article 28; 
Article 29 Section 1; Article 33 Section 1 and 2; Article 34; Article 40; Article 42; and last) 
but not least Article 43. 
With these structures kept in mind the First Federal District Courts jurisdiction is 
well established and has the expectation of the exercise of comity, reciprocity arid 
exclusive jurisdiction over these issues to be respected by the courts, attorneys and 
u 
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plaintiffs who should be ( jer to find a simple and-equitable r )lution, as time is of the] 
essence. 
Datei 
BY THE COURT: 
his 8th day 
Judcje Henry Clayton 
r, 2008 
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The undersigned hereby rtifies that they caused a true and! :rect copy of the 
foregoing ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS to be delivered to the following: 
NAME ADDRESS 
«th 4m District Court of Utah 
Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil 
Kimball, Tirey and St. John 
Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq. 
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough 
James H. Woodall 
Woodall & Wassermann 
Mr. Randall L. Jeffs 
Dated: £gC-ff-6£ 
350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
10 E. S. Temple #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84113 
10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
90 N. 100 E. 
P.O Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
JC h I *Q • |&U£&. ±& . A r i t */ *&m J '&-S 
Juan Antonio Granados, Petitioner 
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* * * * * * * 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * 
IN RE 
GR 2 Enterprises, LLC, 
Debtor 
Case No. 08-24417 JAB 
Chapter 7 
DECLARATION OF JUAN 
ANTONIO GRANADOS, SR. 
* * * * * * * 
I, Juan Antonio Granados, Sr., make the following declaration under penalty of 
perjury based oh my personal knowledge: . 
1. I am a member manager of GR 2 Enterprises, LLC. 
2. in 1986, my wife, Rosalia Granados, and I purchased a 27 acre farm in 
Fillmore California. There we worked the land and raised our family. I also worked as a 
Crane operator. 
3. The farm is improved with 2 residences, one at 1729 Muir Street and the -
other at 1021 Oak Avenue, Fillmore, CA 93015. 
4. In 2004, because our children had grown, and many of them lived in Utah 
Filed: 08/15/08 0015 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I . ( -
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Document Page 2 of 7 
Valley, we decided to sell our farm and move to Utah. In 2004 we had an offer on the 
property, which failed to close and resulted in litigation, which was resolved favorably to 
us. In 2006, we received an acceptable offer on our farm property, so we released the 
prior buyer from their obligation and entered into a contract to sell it to a new buyer for 
$3,300,000.00. At that time we owed approximately $625,000.00 on a first mortgage 
and $213,000 on some other liens incurred in connection with the litigation. The buyer 
wanted to develop the property and requested that we remove our fruit trees, which we 
did. We looked for a house in Utah Valley and found one to our liking at 480 W. 870 S., 
Orem, UT 84097. The buyer delayed closing on the purchase of our farm property in 
California. We wanted to buy the Orern property, but did not have the funds to do so 
until we got money from our California farm. The sellers of the Orem home were very 
motivated and were offering it at a reduced price of $673,000.00. We considered that 
price to be an exceptionally good offer that we wanted to accept 
5. To avoid losing the purchase of the Orem house to other buyers, we sought 
for a loan against our California farm so we could buy the house in Orem. A friend 
Introduced me to a loan officer, Richard Hernandez, who said he could arrange such 
financing with DFI Properties, LLC f DFI" herein). 
6. Through the course of many discussions with Mr. Hernandez and 
representatives of DFI, we agreed to borrow enough money, secured by the California 
farm, to enable us to pay cash for the Orem house. Because there was more than 
enough equity in the farm, the loan was to be secured only by the farm. DFI had their 
own appraisers value the farm property. DFi's appraisal showed that the property was 
worth $2,800,000.00, a conservative valuation given that we had a pending offer at 
2 
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$3,300,000.00. 
7. In connection with our first attempted sale of the farm property, we created 
GR 2 Enterprise, LLC, ("GR T herein) to handle our real estate transactions. My wife 
and! each own 50% of the membership interest of GR 2. Based on the pending sale of 
the farm property for $3,300,000.00, we transferred our farm property to GR 2 about 
May 11,2006. 
8. The amount of money needed to purchase the Orem house and pay off the 
existing debt on the farm was approximately $1,511,876.90. I advised Mr. Hernandez 
that f did not have sufficient income to make payments on such a loan and requested 
that the loan amount include sufficient money to make the payments on the loan for a 
year, an amount of time that I believed to be more than enough for the sale of the farm 
to dose and pay off the proposed loan. They agreed to provide a years worth of 
payments in the loan. On behalf of GR 2,1 agreed to borrow $1,775,000.00, which was 
represented to me to be the amount necessary to pay off the underlying debt on the 
farm and pay for the Orem house and make the payments on the new loan for a year. 
The proposed term of the new loan was to be 3 years with monthly payments of interest 
only. The excess loan proceeds were to be placed in a trust account from which the 
monthly payments would be made as they came due. The interest rate was not agreed 
to, nor were late penalties and origination fees. Movant's representatives said .that after 
the loan closed I would be given a check for sufficient money to purchase the Orem 
residence. They never provided me with a good faith estimate of the loan costs. 
9. During the application and negotiation.process, Mr. Hernandez repeatedly • 
passed on to me reassurances from DFI representatives saying not to worry, because 
3 
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they were taking care of everything. 
10. At the time of making the loan application, Mr. Hernandez instructed me to 
sign the application in blank and said he would fill in the blanks, which he did/ 
11. While I was conducting business in Utah, I received a phone call from Mr. 
Hernandez informing me that the loan was ready to close and that I should come 
immediately to California to sign the documents. I arrived at the closing office at about 
10 minutes prior to their close of business. The dosing agent directed me to a large 
stack of documents and instructed me to hurry and sign them because they were 
closing in 10 minutes. Without my knowledge and contrary to our agreements on the 
subject, one of the documents they had me sign was a deed of trust on the Orem 
house. Also, the terms of the promissory note they had me sign, especially the interest 
rate and default provisions had never been agreed upon. The origination fees had 
never been agreed upon. Because I was hurried by the dosing agent, I did not notice 
these things while I was signing. 
12.1 did not get a copy of the closing documents until about 4 days after the 
closing. It was only then when I discovered that they had me sign a deed of trust on the 
Orem residence. It was only then when I discovered that they had provided for high 
interest rate, unreasonable penalties and excessive origination fees. It was only then 
when I saw that they had provided a fund for only 8 months worth of payments. When I 
questioned Mr. Hernandez about the reduction to 8 months, he said that would be 
enough because the buyers of the farm property were ready to close. I supposed that it 
was too late to have the documents corrected to conform to pur agreement Movant did 
not send me the money to buy the Utah house, but instead sent the check directly to 
4 
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the sellers. 
13. Ultimately; the purchasers of my farm property failed to close. I heard that 
someone had advised them that they were paying too much for the property. 
14. After the sale failed, I put the farm property back on the market. I did not get 
new acceptable offers. Eventually the trust fund for the interest payments ran out, 3 
months earlier than had been represented to me. I marshaled my resources and made 
1 payment in addition to the ones that were made from the trust fund. DFI failed to pay 
me interest on the money they had in the trust fund. 
15. Subsequently, I obtained offers of long term financing on the Orem home 
which would enable me to easily refinance the balance on the farm property. I 
proposed the payoffs to DFI. DFI repeatedly refused to allow me to refinance the Orem 
home and the farm property separately even though the Orem home was not supposed 
to be collateral for the loan. Instead, DFI proceeded to foreclosure.. 
16. A friend introduced me to some people who said they could help me 
preserve our equity in our properties. They filled out papers which they had me sign 
giving them fractional interests in the properties, in exchange for which they were to 
advance me three installments of $45,000 each. The money they committed to provide 
was to enable me to reinstate the loan and hold off the foreclosure. They failed to 
provide the money and filed bankruptcies, using what the California courts said were 
improper means to try to hold off the foreclosure. 
17. Subsequently, they have disappeared and have failed to return my phone 
calls. 
18. \ never received any papers from the California Bankruptcy Courts regarding 
5 
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the California Bankruptcy cases of the individuals involved in Capistrano Enterprises, 
Carpenter Group, and Marengo Associates. I did not know their methods were 
improper. I did not know that they had no ability nor intention to pay me the $45,000.00 
payments they committed to do. 
August 15f 2008 
/s/ Juan Antionio Granados 
6 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served via ECF or caused to be mailed a correct copy of 
the foregoing document via first-ciass mail, postage prepaid, on the 15th day of August, 
2008, to the following: 
US Trustee ECF 
Philip G. Jones ECF 
Chapter 7 Trustee 
• James H. Woodail 
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
GR 2 Enterprises, LLC 
480 West 870 South 
Orem.UT 84058 
/s/ Candace-Simrhonds 
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Attorney or Party Nams, Addtces. Telephone A Fax Numbers, and California Stale Bar Number 
JAMES JAY STOFFEL, S8N. 083947 
BE8£RMAN STOf PEL & BEBERMAN 
7676 HAZARD CENTER DRIVE, STE, 500 
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108 
619-297-4800 (T) / 619-297^807 (F) 
jstoffel@bsbtew.org 
H I Individual Qppearing without counsel 
XX Attorney for Afovartf 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
In re; 
SAMUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER G R O U P 
Dobtor($). 
K«coOr<pfgE0ii« ENTERED 
MAY 27 2008 
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Centraf District or California 




TIME: 11:30 A M . 
CTRM: 1375 
FLOOR: 13TH 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
UNDER 11 US.C. § 362 (Real Property) 
(MOVANT: DPI PROPERTIES, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LLC ) 
1. The Motion was: D Contested Uncontested Q Settled by Stipulation 
2. The Motfon affects the following real property fProperty*): 
Street Address: BKOPERTY KO, X: 48$ WB$T 3BO SOOTH, OREH, OTAR 8405B 
ApwtmentfSuite N<x: FKOJ?ERTY NO. 2 : i7«o MUIR STFEBT A»D iQ2* OAK AVENOS, FILHORE. CA 93015 
Oiy, State, Zip Code: 
Legal description or document recording number (including county of recording): 
PROPERTY NO. 1 : WAfl 6ftOI>£H¥Y - UTAH COUNTY 
rnWKKTY HC. 2 : CALIFORNIA PROPERTY - VENTURA COUtfTY 
[Xl See attached page. USSM. uescftm-ioNS ATTACHED AS ATTACHMENT A AND ATTACKKsmr a. 
3. The Motion fe granted under: Q 11 U.&.C. § 362(d)(1) Q 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) D 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) 
jg] 11USwC.§ 362(d)(4) 
4. As to Movant, its successors, transferees and assigns ("Movant"), the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is; 
a. (El Terminated as to Debtors) and Debtors*) bankruptcy estate. 
&. CI Annulled retroactively to the date of the bankruptcy petition filing. 
c. O Modified or condiUoned as set forth In Exhibit to this Order. 
5. S3 Movant may enforce its remedies to foreclose upon and obtain possession of the Property in accordance with applicable non-
bankruptcy tew, but may not pursue any deficiency claim against the Debtors) or property of the estate except by Wing a Proof 
of Claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501. 
(TNs Ortfer is coniimmf on next page) 
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in TO. 
S A M E U E L A N D R E W S D B A C A R P E N T E R G R O U P 
Debtors). 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER O8-11370-AA-13 
S, C ] Movant shall not conduct a foreclosure sale before the following date (specify): 
The stay shall remain in effect subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Adequate Protection Attachment to this 
Order. 
8. Q In chapter 13 cases, the trustee shall not make any further payments on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this 
Order. The secured portion of Movant's claim is deemed withdrawn upon entry of this Order without prejudice to Movants 
right to file an amended unsecured claim for any deficiency. Absent a stipulation or order to the contrary, Movant shall return 
to the trustee any payments received from the trustee on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this Order. 
9, E 3 Tn& ^"9 of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors that Involved either; 
03 transfer of all or part ownership of. or other interest in, the Property without the consent of the secured creditor or court 
approval. 
(A} multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the Property. 
if recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices Of interest or liens m the Property, this Order Is binding and 
effective under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)4(A) and (B) in any ether bankruptcy case purporting to affect the Property filed not later than 
two (2) years after the date of entry of this Order, except that a debtor in a subsequent bankruptcy case may move for relief from 
this Order based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after notice and a hearing. Any federal, state or local 
governmental unit that accepts notices of interests or liens in real property shall accept a certified copy of this Order for indexing 
and recording. 
1D. This Court further orders as follows: 
a. [ 3 This Order shall be binding and effective despite any conversion of thi$ bankruptcy case to a case under any other 
chapter of Title 11 of the United States Code. 
b. £ 3 The 10-day stay provided by Bankruptcy Rule 40G1 (a)(3) is waived, 
a §3 The provisions set form in the Extraordinary Relief Attachment shall also apply (attach Optional Fom f 4QQ1-W-GR). 
a IS See attached continuation page for additional provisions, LEGAL DESCRiprioNS OP PRODEBTY 
ATTACHMENT A - UTAH PHQPiSjm 
ATTACHMENT a - CALIFORNIA PSOP^RTV 
D A T E D : May 27,2008 
United Stales Bankruptcy judge 
This form is mandatory by Order of the United Stales Bankruptcy Court for tfte Central District of California. 
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In re: 
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP 
Debtor(s). 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13 
(OPTIONAL) 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF ATirACHMENT 
(MOVANT: PFl PROPERTIES. LLC. A CALIFORNIA LLC) 
(This Attachment is the continuation page for Paragraph 10c of the foregoing Order.) 
Based upon evidence of efforts by Debtor(s) or others acting in concert with Debtor(s) to delay, hinder or defraud Movant 
by abusive bankruptcy filings, this court further orders as follows: 
1. • This Order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against the Debtor(s) for a period of 
180 days from the hearing of the Motion. 
2. n This Order is binding m6 effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against any successors, 
transferees, or assignees of the above-named Debtor(s) for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion. 
• without further notice. 
• upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-
bankruptcy law. 
3. • This Order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against any debtor(s) who daim{s) 
any interest in the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion. 
• without further notice. 
• upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-
bankruptcy law, 
4. • This Order is binding and effective in any future bankruptcy case, no matter who the debtor(s) may be 
• without further notice. 
• upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-
bankruptcy law. 
5. • The Debtor(s) is/are hereby enjoined from transferring all or any portion of the Property for a period of 180 days 
from the hearing of the Motion except as may be authorized by further order of this Court, and any transfer in 
violation of this Order is void. 
6. Q The Sheriff or Marsha! may evict the Debtor(s) and any other occupant from the subject Property regardless of 
any future bankruptcy filing concerning the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion. 
• without further notice. 
• upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-
bankruptcy law. 
7. £3 Other (specify): That this order be binding and effective in any other case under the Bankruptcy Code purporting 
to affect the subject real property filed not later than two years after the date of entry, upon recording a copy of the 
order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-bankruptcy law, except that a debtor in 
subsequent case may move for relief from the order based upon good cause shown after notice and hearing. 
This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. 
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tare: 
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP 
Debtor($)-
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13 
ATTACHMENT A 
All of Lot I, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3&4, plat "B", JENSEN COVE SUBDIVISION, Orem, 
Utah, according to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
Tax Serial No. 43:066:0001 
This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Centrai District of California. 
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In re: 
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP 
Debtors). 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER 0e-11370-AA-13 
ATTACHMENT B 
The land referred to is situated in the unincorporated area of the County of Ventura, State of California, and is 
described as follows; 
Parcel 1: 
Lots 90 and 91 of the Fillmore Subdivision of the Sespe Rancho, in ithe County of Venture, State of California, 
as per Map recorded in Book 3, Page 5 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of said County, together 
with that portion of the Southerly one-half of Muir Street, abandoned 
Except all of the oil, gas and mineral substances lying in or under said land, without, however the right to enter 
upon the surface thereof or within 500 feet of the surface thereof for the purpose of drilling or extracting same, 
as reserved in Grant Deed recorded April 11, 1986, as Instrument No. 86-042944, Official Records. 
Parcel 2: 
Part of Farm Lots 88 and 89 of the Fillmore Subdivision of the Sespe Rancho, in the County of Ventura, State 
of California,, as per Map recorded in Book 3, Page 5 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of said 
County, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a % inch iron steel bar set at the most Westerly corner of said Farm Lot 88; thence along line No. 
78 of the Final Survey of the Rancho Sespe; 
1st: North 32°30' East 753.65 feet to a Y* inch steel bar set at the point of intersection of said Line No. 78 with 
the South line of Muir Street; thence along said South line, 
2nd: South 79°56'30" East 105.01 feet to a 54 inch iron pipe set in the Northeasterly line of said Farm Lot 89; 
thence along said line, 
3rd: South 47°04'30" East 528.12 feet to a 1 inch iron pipe; thence, 
4th: South 16°47' East 256.66 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence, 
5th: South 8°06' West 90.11 feet to a 3/4 inch iron pipe; thence, 
6th: North 87°29'30" West 124.96 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence, 
7th: South 15°19' West 175.49 feet to a Vi inchironpipe; thence, 
8th: South 29°40'30" West 312,11 feet to a Vi inch iron pipe; thence, 
(continued on page 7) 
This fomi is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. 
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SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP 
Debtors). 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER Q8-11370-AA-13 
(continued from page 6) 
9th: North 42*50' West 428.96 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence, 
10th: North 69°04' West 222.22 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence, 
11th: North 48°16'30" West 177.19 feet to the point of beginning together with that portion of the Southerly 
one-half of Muir Street, abandoned. 
Except all of the oil, gas and mineral substances lying in or under said land, without, however the right to enter 
upon the surface thereof of within 500 feet of the surface thereof, for the purpose of drilling or extracting the 
same as reserved in Grant Deed recorded April 11, 1986, as Instrument No. 86-042944, Official Records. 
This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. 
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In re: 
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP 
Debtor(s). 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
l( Jonathan Freyt hereby declare: 
I am employed in the County of San Diego, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the 
within action. My business address is 7676 Hazard Center Drive, Suite 500f San Diego, California, 92108. I am 
personally and readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing 
with the United States Postal Service, pursuant to which mail placed for collection at designated stations in the 
ordinary course of business is deposited the same day, proper postage prepaid, with the United States Postal 
Service, 
On May 23, 2008,1 served: [PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC 
STAY on the parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof, on the above date, enclosed in a sealed envelope, 
following the ordinary business practice, for collection and mailing in the United States mail addressed as follows: 
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that 
the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on May 23, 2008, at San Diego, California. 
fs,l Jonathan Frev 
This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. • 
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Dba Carpenter Group 
6300 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
DEBTOR'S AFFILIATE: 
Gary Barnette 
Dba Marengo Associates 
23545 Crenshaw Blvd. 
Torrance, CA 90505 
ORIGINAL BORROWER: 
Juan A. Granados, Manager 
GR2 Enterprises, LLC 
580 West 870 South 
Orem.UT 84058 
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE: 
KathyADockery 
700 S. Flower Street, Suite 1950 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
OFFICE OF THE US TRUSTEE: 
United States Trustee 
725 S. Figueroa Street, 26th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
!
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
In re: 
Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates, 
Debtors). 
In re: 





ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Date: June 19,2008 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: 255 E. Temple Street 
Courtroom 1375 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
The Court invokes its power under i 1 U.S.C. § 105(a), to cany out the provisions in 11 ULS.C. § 
362 and to prevent an abuse of process, and issues this order to show cause ("OSC"). This OSC is in 
response to the numerous transfers of fractional interests in real properties to entities, which then file for 
bankruptcy, solely to invoke the protection of the automatic stay. The cases where such a scheme has 
taken place are: 
- l 
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• LA 08-11972 AA, Gary Bamette dba Marengo Associates, Ch 13, filed 2/15/08, pending 
• LA 08-11370 AA, Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group, Ch 13, filed 2/1/08, pending 
• LA 07-20557 AA, Jeny Baltare dba Concourse Group, Ch 13, filed 11 /l 5/07, dismissed on 
12/20/07 
• LA 08-12532 AA, Daniel Davies dba Stevenson Affiliates, Ch 13, filed 2/28/08, dismissed 
on 5/2/08 
• LA 07-11481 AA, Carol Miller dba Compton Affiliates, Ch 13, filed 2/26/07, dismissed on 
11/9/07 
• LA 07-15591 AA, Samuel Jester dba Imperial Enterprises and Imperial Investments, filed 
7/3/07, dismissed on 8/6/07 
• LA 07-17741 AA, Thomas Garton dba Fountain Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 9/4/07, dismissed 
on 10/3/07 
• LA 07-18777 AA, Steven Jonkins dba Oceanside Associates, Ch 13, filed 10/3/07, dismissed 
on 10/29/07 
• LA 08-10838 AA, Norman Perkon dba Empire Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 1/22/08, dismissed 
on 2/15/08 
• LA 07-22106 AA, Bany Stantol dba Mercer Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 12/26/07, dismissed on 
4/8/08 
• LA 08-10239 AA, Button Wolke dba Thorton Group, Ch 13, filed 1/7/08, dismissed on 
2/4/08 
• LA 07-21533 AA, Randy Cartere dba Portland Associates, Ch 13, filed 12/10/07, dismissed 
on 3/11/08 
• LA 07-10020 AA, Gary Alan Green dba Saturn Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 1/3/07, dismissed 
on 6/7/07 
0075 
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• LA 07-15050 AA, Victor Starker dba Catalina Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 6/18/07, dismissed 
on 7/25/07 
• LA 07-17008 AA, Barry E. Woodsy dba Cromwell Group, Ch 13, filed 8/14/07, dismissed 
on 9/14/07 
• LA 08-13298 VK, Peter Edgewood dba Capistrano Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 3/14/08, 
dismissed on 4/14/08 
• LA 07-12750 AA, Thomas Vermont dba Olympic West Group, Ch 13, filed 4/4/07, 
dismissed on 5/4/07 
• LA 07-13506 AA, William Parson dba Alameda Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 4/30/07, dismissed 
on 5/31/07 
• LA 07-14438 AA, Grant Wilson dba Broadway Holdings, Ch 13, filed 5/30/07, dismissed on 
7/6/07 
• LA 07-14731 EC, Lucio Alejandro Gonzales dba Opel Funding, Ch 13, filed 6/7/07, 
dismissed on 8/6/07, reopened 3/27/08 
• LA 07-17930 AA, Ike Nathaniel King dba Ink Holdings, Ch 13, filed 9/10/07, dismissed 
12/19/07 
• LA 07-19717 AA, George Falkner dba Carnival Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 10/26/07, dismissed 
on 12/3/07 
• LA 08-13990 VZ, John Portero dba Almaden Group, Ch 13, filed 3/27/08, dismissed on 
6/10/08 
• LA 08-13298 VK, Peter Edgewood dba Capistrano Enterprises, filed 3/14/08, dismissed on 
4/14/08 
• LA 07-16270 AA, Arthur Lamb dba Lexington Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 7/24/07, dismissed 
on 12/12/07 
-3 
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• LA 07-13539 AA, Phillip Baker dba Redondo Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 5/1/07, dismissed on 
6/7/07 
• LA 07-12784 AA, George Bledsoe dba Mercury Affiliates, Ch 13, filed 4/5/07, dismissed on 
5/19/08 
• LA 07-12107 AA, Terry Larson dba Bayside Group, Ch 13, filed 3/15/07, dismissed on 
5/4/07 
• LA 07-10523 AA, Greg Este dba Venice Affiliates, Ch 13, filed 1/23/07, dismissed on 
3/14/07, reopened on 4/1/08 
• LA 07-10235 AA, Calvin Johnson dba Rockwell Group, Ch 13, filed 1/11/07, dismissed on 
3/1/07 
All of the above cases share similar facts. The debtors in the above cases never appeared in their 
cases. Together, over a hundred motions for relief from the automatic stay have been filed in these 
cases. As of June 11,2008, 33 motions for relief from the automatic stay were filed in the Bamette case, 
and 69 motions for relief from the automatic stay were filed in the Andrews case. 
The borrowers transferred a fractional interest in their properties to an individual with a fictitious 
business name, who then filed for bankruptcy. 
Fractional interests in the same property were transferred to multiple debtors listed above. 
For example, Janice McClinton transferred the following interests in her property located at 5458 
Cambria Drive, Mira Loma, California: 
1. an undivided 1/8 interest to Capistrano Enterprises on March 17,2008; 
2. an undivided 1/8 interest to Concourse Group on December 4,2007; 
3. an undivided 1/8 interest to Empire Enterprises on January 18,2008; and 
4. an undivided 1/8 interest to Marengo Associates on February 20,2008, post petition. 
-4 
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In another example, Karen Tisdale transferred the following interests in her property located at 
4744-4746 Cape May Avenue, San Diego, California: 
1. an undivided 1/8 interest to Alameda Enterprises on August 25, 2006; 
2. an undivided 1/8 interest to Almaden Group on October 27,2007; 
3. an undivided 1/8 interest to Broadway Holdings on August 25, 2006; 
4. an undivided 1/8 interest to Carnaval Enterprises on December 22,2006; 
5. an undivided 1/8 interest to Carpenter Group on February 11, 2008; 
6. an undivided 1/8 interest to Cromwell Group on December 22, 2006; 
7. an undivided 1/8 interest to Empire Enterprises on July 22,2007; 
8. an undivided 1/8 interest to Fountain Enterprises on December 22,2006; 
9. an undivided 1/8 interest to Hazan Holding Co on May 10,2007; 
10. an undivided 1/8 interest to Marengo Associates on September 15, 2007; 
11. an undivided 1/8 interest to Ink Holdings on April 27,2007; 
12. an undivided 1/8 interest to Olympic West Group on August 25, 2006; 
13. an undivided 1/8 interest to Opel Funding on April 17,2007; 
14. an undivided 1/8 interest to Portland Associates on February 12,2006; 
15. an undivided 1/8 interest to Stevenson Affiliates on September 15, 2006; and 
16. an undivided 1/8 interest to Thorton Group on January 22,2007. 
These sixteen "undivided 1/8 interest" transfers purportedly exceed what the original borrower 
even owned. 
Fractional interests were transferred to the various debtors around the petition date, both pre and 
post petition. None of the properties where the original borrower transferred a fractional interest to the 
debtors and that are subject to the relief from stay motions were listed in the debtors* schedules. There 
is no proof of the debtors' interest in the properties, other than the fact that the original borrowers 
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transferred fractional interests in the properties to the debtors around the time the petition was filed. All 
these cases were chapter 13 cases. 
It appears that these cases were fraudulently filed solely to invoke the automatic stay under 11 
U.S.C § 362 to prevent foreclosures. Accordingly, there does not appear to be any intent to honestly 
prosecute these bankruptcy cases. 
Based upon a review of the dockets and documents filed in each of these cases, it appears that 
the following individuals are involved in the fraudulent filing of these bankruptcy cases ("Involved 
Persons"):1 
• Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates 
• Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group 
WHEREFORE,, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates and 
Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group shall show cause why the Court should not make a finding that 
these transfers are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and why an omnibus order 
granting relief from the automatic stay applicable to all real property interests transferred to such 
debtor(s) should not be entered for any party having an interest in such property without a court hearing 
for any transfers made to this debtor or his fictitious business name, whether such transfer was made in 
the past or in the future, annulled to the petition date. It is contemplated that if relief is afforded 
pursuant to (his OSC, there will be no need for a party who has an interest in properties transferred to 
these debtors to file a motion for relief from the automatic stay as against these debtors and any other 
debtor that subsequently obtains an interest in property that was transferred to these debtors. 
1
 The fact that this Court lists these persons should not be taken to mean that the Court believes all of these persons really 
exist. The Court reserves judgment on whether fictitious names are being used. Additionally, other unknown persons may be 
a part of this fraudulent scheme. To the extent that further evidence comes out at the hearing on this Order to Show Cause 
supporting the Court's suspicions as to the existence of other participating persons, the Court may issue further Orders to 
Show Cause against them. 
-6 
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Responses to this Order to Show Cause, if any, shall be in writing and filed with the Court and 
served on the Chapter 13 trustee and the U.S. Trustee on or before June 18,2008. Any opposition not 
filed may be deemed waived. 
DATED: June 12, 2008 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
-7 
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SERVICE LIST FOR ENTERED ORDER 
SERVED ELECTRONICALLY 
Counsel for Option One Mortgage 
Jennifer C Wong bknotice@mccarthvholthus.com 
Counsel for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, 
Jennifer C Wong bknotice@mccarthyholthus,com 
Counsel for National City Bank 
BrianAPaino ecfcacb@piteduncan.com 
Counsel for Countrywide Bank 
Mark Domeyer mdomever@rriilesieqal.com 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
Kathy A Dockery pqozun@ch13la.com 
United States Trustee (LA) ustpreaioni 6.la.ecf@usdoi.gov 
SERVED BY U.S. MAIL 
Gary Barnette 
23545 Crenshaw Bl 
Torrance, CA 90505 
Samuel Andrews 
6300WiishireBI 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
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PETER C. ANDERSON 
United States Trustee 
Jill Sturtevant, SBN 89395 
Assistant U.S. Trustee _____ 
Alvin Mar, SBN 151482 
Trial Attorney 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2600 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
(213) 894-4219 
(213) 894-2603 facsimile number 
CLERK U.S. SANKRUfTCV COURT 
C E N T H A L C ! S : R I C T C F 2AUTOHN|A 
• V Ctfvtf Cfel* 
ORIGINAL 
7 
CENTRAL rcrttat OF CALIFO/W A 
OYi /I IV DtpgtyCkrlt 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
LOS ANGELES DIVISION 
In re 
SAMUEL ANDREWS dba Carpenter Group, 
Debtor. 
Case No. 2:08-bk-11370-AA 
Chapter 13 
£w&a*\ R&U6F 
ORDER ON COURT'S 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Date: JULY 2, 2008 
Time: 11:30 A.M. 
Courtroom: 1375 
This matter came before the Court at the above stated hearij 
date and time with appearances as noted on the record. The Cour 
finding no objections filed in connection with its Order to Sh< 
Cause, finds that the real property transfers described in this 
Court's Order to Show Cause are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors. This Court finding good cause therein -
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the automatic stay as to all real 
property transfers to the Debtor or to his fictitious business 
name, whether made pre-petition or post-petition, shall be and 
hereby is annulled effective February 1, 2008, Such relief from 
the automatic stay shall be effective for two years from the date 
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of the entry of this order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362 (d) (4). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any creditor having a security 
interest in any real property held in the name of- the Debtor or 
Debtor's fictitious business name, whether in whole or in part, 
need not file a motion for relief from the automatic stay as 
against the Debtor or Debtor's fictitious business name, but that 
such creditor is required to comply with applicable state law 
regarding the recording requirements of 11 U.S.C. §362(d){4). 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, state of 
California, in the Office of the Unites States Trustee under the 
supervision of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction 
the service hereinafter described was made; I am over the age of 18 
and not a party to the within action; and my business address is: 
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2600, Los Angeles California 
90017, 
On JUL 7 2008
 f i served the foregoing document described 
as: ORDER ON COURT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE on the interested parties 
at their last known address in the action by placing a true and 
correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope with sufficient postage 
thereon full prepaid, in the United States Mail at Los angeles, 
California, addressed as follows: 
DEBTOR: 
Samuel Andrews 
dba Carpenter Group 
6300 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY: 
in pro se 
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE: 
Kathy A- Dockery 
700 S. Flower Street, Suite 1950 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - AMERICAN FORK COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DFI PROPERTIES, LLC, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 





JUDGE DAVID MORTENSEN 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on December 8, 2008. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From CD Recording) 
ORIGINAL F ILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County; State of Utah I 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER ^ 
LIC. 102811-7801 
PHONE: (801) 423-6463 EMAIL: abbpe@yahoo.com 
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A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
FOR PLAINTIFF: 
THOMAS B, PRICE, ESQ. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH 
GATEWAY TOWER EAST #900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
RANDALL L. JEFFS, ESQ. 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 NORTH 200 EAST 
PROVO UT 84603 
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PHR-0-C-EHS~D-I~N--G--S 
(December 8, 2008) 
(Recording turned on late), 
MR. JEFFS: — other things that a, he would not 
vacate the home, I would no longer be allowed to represent 
him, and that I would not be allowed and should have no 
further contact with him whatsoever. And at that point he 
refused to talk to me further, 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I've also received, and I 
don't know if any of you have received, some documents which 
were filed in court today by Mr, Granados. Have any of you 
received those? 
MR. PRICE: (Short includible). 
THE JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: No, I have not. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. What we have is a document, 
it's a, it's stamped dated for .today's date in my court. 
It's also a, stamp dated by the Ministry of Justice for the 
Nato Indian Nation. There's three documents. A petition 
for hearing to show cause, stay of proceedings and a 
declaratory relief. The second document is an order to 
stay the proceedings, this order issued by a Judge Henry 
Clayton from the First Federal District Court Western Region 
of the Nato Indian Nation says that it is staying this 
action and the action of the Superior Court of California, 
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And then the third document is an order, order for hearing 
to show cause scheduled for December 16, 2008. I quote: 
"At a time and place to be determined". I'm not so sure 
that complies with due process since it doesn't tell us where 
the hearing is to take place. 
In any event, this is a serious issue. I've 
already forwarded it on to a representative of the a, 
Administrative Office of the Courts to the extent that any 
of it can be construed to be ordering me to do anything. 
I also plan to refer the matter to the county attorney for 
prosecution. But at a minimum a, and Mr. Jeffs, we will let 
you out of this case rather shortly. 
MR. JEFFS: Uh~huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: But the first thing I need to do is 
to have a Rule 11 contempt hearing in the next a, little 
while to decide whether to strike all of defendant's 
pleadings and enter a default based on a Rule 11 violation. 
MR. JEFFS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: So that's what I want to schedule. 
Because since your client hasn't moved, the purpose of our 
hearing today was to find out whether your client had moved 
out. 
MR. PRICE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: And in the event he hadn't we were 
going to stick to our trial date. However, given these 
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intervening pleadings a, I am not willing to interfere with 
the lives of a, 30 to 40 members of our public when a bad 
faith action such as this have tciken place. 
So, I'm going to impose on you, Mr, Jeffs, to a, 
because at the moment you1re still counsel of record, and I 
totally understand the perplexing and uncomfortable situation 
that this puts you in. 
MR. JEFFS: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: And if you can just abide a little 
further a, we will release you from this case because it's 
not tenable for you to continue under the circumstances. 
MR. JEFFS: Great, 
THE JUDGE: But I need to have a hearing. 
Mr. Price, how is your availability this week? 
MR. PRICE: I will work around the court's 
schedule, Your Honor. 









Okay. How, how you do you look 
Ifm wide open. 
I have an oral argument at 9:00 a.m. 
Okay. (Short inaudible discussion 
(Short inaudible, no mic), 
I'm looking at maybe 2:30 tomorrow 
PAOT R 
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MR. JEFFS: Okay. 
THE CLERK: (Short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll have a hearing tomorrow 
at 2:30 on the court sua sponte Rule 11 determination. It's 
the allegation of the court, and you'll need to put this 
probably the a letter to your client, Mr. Jeffs. 
MR. JEFFS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And a, if you fear for your safety I 
would suggest you employ a constable to serve your letter. 
MR. JEFFS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: It is. the allegation of the court 
that the pleadings which have been filed a, have been done 
for an improper purpose to unnecessarily delay this matter. 
Secondly, to needlessly increase the costs of litigation. 
That the allegations in the petition are not warranted by 
existing law and are in fact frivolous. And that the judge 
or the purported judge who signed these documents should 
already have notice that they wouldn't be recognized by a 
court since there's a 10th Circuit opinion noting that 
this a, purported tribe isn't recognized by the Department of 
Interior, which is a.significant issue jurisdictionally. 
Additionally, I would note that apparently 
Mr. Granados is attempting to move forward pro se 
representing a corporate entity,, which as we all know is not 
going to happen. 
vmnr? & 
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So in your letter also inform him that if he wants 
to be heard he'll need to bring a lawyer. 
MR. JEFFS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. PRICE: Your Honor, this is Thomas Price. 
If I may indulge the court, could I get the court to fax me a 





— so I can look at them? 
You bet. Let's verify your a, fax 
number here. I probably have it on the pleading. 
MR. PRICE: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: 801-364-9127. 
MR. PRICE: That is correct. 
THE JUDGE: All right. That will be faxed to you 
in the next few minutes. 
Is there anything else the parties want me to 
address today? I would anticipate, Mr. Jeffs, that at the 
end of the hearing tomorrow I'11 make a final ruling on your 
motion to withdraw. 





I would do that, yes. 
Yes. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else, Mr. Price? 
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MR. PRICE: You know, Your Honor/ I!ve never, I 
don't know how to prepare for this hearing. Ifve never had 
one of these before. But no, I'm good. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, obviously if you need... 
I'm giving you a very short time. 
MR. PRICE: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: The pleadings we're going to fax 
to you are not obviously involved. But if you wanted to 
file something on behalf of your client you can do that. 
I just, it needs to be noted and it's important to note that 
the a, hearing is being set at the court's own initiative 
because— 
MR. PRICE: Yes, that's fine. 
THE JUDGE: — the safe harbor provisions of 
Rule 11 only apply to'parties, not the court. Otherwise, 
I'd have to wait 21 days. If you were to make a Rule 11 
motion I can't act on it for 21 days. But on my own motion I 
can, I can do that immediately. 
MR.'PRICE: All right. I'll be there and ready 
at 2:30, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Very good. 
MR. JEFFS: As will I. 
THE JUDGE: We'll see you tomorrow. 
MR. JEFFS: Thank you. 
WHEREUPON, the proceeding was concluded. . 
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STATE OF UTAH 





I, Penny C, Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded CD 08-23HRM2 in 
the matter of DFI VS. GR 2, hearing date December 8, 2008, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 8, inclusive except where it is indicated that the 
tape recording was inaudible, 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 17th day of 
February, 2009. 
PEWY C. ABBOTT, ^ OURT 
License 22(=*02811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12 
L 
PENNY C ABBOTT 
Norm PUBLIC • STAJIOIUTAII 
COMMISSION NO. 575806 
OOMM. EXP. 09/24/2012 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - AMERICAN FORK COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 








JUDGE DAVID MORTENSEN 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on December 9, 2008. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From CD Recording) 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 




PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER 
LIC. 102811-7801 
PHONE: (801) 423-6463 EMAIL: abbpe@yahoo.com 
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A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
FOR PLAINTIFF: 
THOMAS B. PRICE, ESQ. 
• CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH 
GATEWAY TOWER EAST #900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
RANDALL L. JEFFS, ESQ. 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 NORTH 200 EAST 
PROVO UT 84603 
MR. GRANADOS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE REF 
DISCUSSION. 3 
BY MR. GRANADOS 4 
BY MR. PRICE . 5 
COURT'S RULING 6 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(December 9, 2008) 
THE JUDGE: Very good. I'm. going to call the next 
case DFI Properties, LLC versus GR 2 Enterprises, LLC, This 
is case 080103867. 
Will counsel state their appearances? 
MR, PRICE: Thomas Price for and on behalf of 
DFI Properties, Your Honor. 
MR. JEFFS: Randall Jeffs on behalf of 
GR 2 Enterprises. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you- This matter was set 
yesterday by order of this court sua sponte on the court's 
Rule 11 motion. It's based upon some documents that this 
court received and communication to the court that a, a 
communication between Mr. Jeffs and his client had ceased. 
Has that situation changed at all? 
MR. JEFFS: It has not, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JEFFS: I'm still under instructions not to 
have further contact. Per the court's instructions I drafted 
a letter outlining the results of yesterday's telephone 
conference and had it served by a constable. I have that 
service. 
THE JUDGE: And it appears that Mr. Granados is 
here present in the courtroom. 
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Mr, Granados, is it accurate that Mr. Jeffs is no 
longer serving as the, it's your desire that Mr. Jeffs no 
longer serve as the attorney of GR 2 Enterprises? 
MR. GRANADOS: According to a letter he sent me 
two days ago that he requires more money (inaudible, away 
from mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Jeffs, I'm going to ask 
you to stay here because I haven't released you yet but you 
may take a seat. And I'll allow Mr. Granados to come up here 
to counsel table. 
Mr. Granados, I have before me three documents. 
They were filed with the court yesterday. They carry a 
caption which is not the caption of this case. It says, 
In regards of Juan Antonio Granados 
versus DFI Funding, Inc. and DFI 
Properties, LLC. 
All three of them appear to be signed a, by you 
both as the petitioner and as the petitioner on the mailing 
certificate. Is that correct? 
MR. GRANADOS: That's correct. 
THE JUDGE: Thatfs your signature? All right. 
One of them is a petition for hearing to show 
cause, stay of petition, and for declaratory relief. The 
second is an order to stay proceedings. And the third is an 
order to, for hearing to show cause setting a hearing on the 
ntt/^T? *i 
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16th of December, 2008 at a time and place to be 
determined. So neither the location nor the time for that 
hearing is contained in the documents. It's ostensibly 
issued by the First Federal District Court in the, of Western 
Region. A court with which a, this court was not familiar 
until yesterday when I received these pleadings and did a 
Lexus search which shows that the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals was familiar with this. 
At that time I gave Mr. Price the opportunity to 
respond to these pleadings if he chose. I haven't seen a 
written response. Did you file one? 
MR. PRICE: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. The purported order that 
I've received purports to stay this case. 
Now, Mr. Granados, did you cause these documents to 
be filed in this court? 
MR. GRANADOS: I brought them myself, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I'm going to let you be 
heard. The reason we're here is the court on its motion 
believes that on their face these a, documents are presented 
for an improper purpose, specifically to unnecessarily delay 
or needlessly increase the costs of litigation here. The 
court has reviewed them and found that their legal 
contentions are not warranted by existing law and are in fact 
frivolous, and that the allegations in them a, don't have 
PAGE 3 
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evidentiary support. 
I'm going to let you address the court on what you 
think should happen at this point. 
MR. GRANADOS: The first thing, as I expressed at 
the beginning, is that Mr- Jeff my legal counsel, when he 
sent me the letter a, giving me instructions coming from this 
court that the thing that I needed to do and the thing that 
he needed to do to help me* From the very moment I started 
getting really sick. I mean, it really hit me and I've been 
sick since then until this day. 
And so and I tried to find a solution to a, get the 
help that I needed including finding the money that he needed 
to, to represent me. Because I couldn't (short 
indecipherable) my illness I had to find other avenues, other 
resources and that's why I ended up getting to file these 
documents. 
Because I believe, Your Honor, honestly with all 
my heart, I have been an honorable citizen of this country 
all my life, and I believe this is a cause that I need to 
pursue, otherwise it will be dropped. But I need, I need to 
a, and those things that I believe that I worked so honestly 
hard all my life to continue to find a solution, a good 
solution that will help me at least to understand. And if 
nothing else can be done I won't do nothing else. But I 
believe that it's there because I, I feel in my heart, 
v>hm? A 
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Your Honor, that we can do something to find a solution to 
this problem. I tried to find it but the other party has 
not helped or cooperated from the very beginning. And I 
have witnesses to that part that they have refused to work 
with me and a, that's why we've come to this point where we 
are right now. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Anything else? 
MR, GRANADOS: Well, I... The other thing is 
that a letter I received yesterday late, in the evening or it 
was dark already, it's a very short time for me to find 
somebody else to help me legally. It's very impossible for 
me to find (short indecipherable) another attorney to help 
me. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: It's about 21 days early for a motion 
from us. What we hope to see the court do is to strike 
GR 2's answer and counterclaim and grant our complaint, DFl's 
complaint, and so we can move forward with the property. 
In the event that's not done we would like to see an 
expedited proceeding for the a, appearance to appear, I mean 
notice to appear on the point and get this thing going. We'd 
like to get this a, this thing resolved. 
The reason that DFI has not responded to the a, 
three pleadings of yesterday we wanted to see what was going 
to happen here first and try to keep my client's expenses to 
T>hflT? G 
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a minimum as well. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I can't find the statute I'm 
looking for* I'm going to take a two minute recess while I 
find the statute. 
(Recess) 
COURTfS RULING 
THE JUDGE: Please be seated. We're back on the 
record of DFI Properties, LLC versus GR 2 Enterprises. 
Mr. Granados, I want to tell you first what I've 
done already yesterday and then tell you what I'm going to do 
today. 
Upon receipt of these documents and looking at the 
internet and finding a couple of cases, one being the 10th 
Circuit case of Nato Nation versus State of Utah where the 
court plainly affirmed a finding that the Department of the 
Interior of the United States of America has failed to 
recognize the Nato Nation as, as an entity that has 
standing. I personally reviewed the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs listing of federally recognized Indian entities 
yesterday as well. Neither this a, entity nor the First 
Federal District Court Western Region are recognized by any 
state or federal court. 
Based upon that I turn then to the Criminal Code of 
the State of Utah. Under 76-8-504, a person is guilty of a 
T>71 S~*T* f 
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Class A a, or Class B Misdemeanor if with intent to deceive a 
public servant such as a judge in the performance of an 
official function that person makes any written false 
statement, or knowingly creates a false impression in a 
written application, or invites reliance on any writing which 
he knows to be lacking authority. 
Now, I'm not saying you're guilty of that crime/ 
Mr. Granados. But there would be under these circumstances 
a question as to whether you knew that these were not 
documents to be recognized by the courts of the State of 
Utah. 
Further, 76-8-513 provides a specific crime of 
false judicial or official notice. 
A person is guilty of a Class B 
misdemeanor who, with purpose to procure 
the compliance of another with a request 
made by that person, knowingly sends, 
mails or delivers to the person a notice 
or other writing which has no judicial or 
other sanction but which in its format or 
appearance simulates a summons, 
complaint, court order or process, or an 
insignia, seal or printed form of a 
federal,, state or local government or an 
instrumentality thereof, or is otherwise 
T*i7V S**T* T 
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calculated to induce a belief that it 
does have a judicial or other official 
sanction. 
The order of stay in this matter purports to be 
from a court, purports to be signed by a judge, and purports 
to order that this matter is stayed. I find it likely that 
that document violates that statute as well. 
Even absent that, however, I find that there's no 
reasonable basis to believe that these documents are 
anything other than frivolous, that they have been submitted 
to this court for, the only reason was to delay these 
proceedings. 
Based upon that finding under Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure I'm going to strike your answer and 
your counterclaim and enter a default against you. 
Do you have a writ? 
MR. PRICE: Yes, Your Honor. May I approach? 
THE JUDGE: You may. Do you want to make a 
copy? Do you have of ai copy? 
MR. PRICE: I don't, Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Dallas, will you make a copy of 
that? 
MR. PRICE: If you want, Your Honor, also (short 
inaudible, away from mic). 
While my clerk is making the copies 
PAttP! ft 
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I need to make one other item of note here, Mr. Granados. 
Should you attempt to take any actions in this 
case in this court or any other court in the state such as 
the court of appeals or the supreme court, you must be 
advised that a corporate entity such as an LLC may not be 
represented by anyone who is not licensed to practice law 
in the State of Utah/ Specifically what that means is if 
you attempt to represent GR 2 Enterprises in any proceeding, 
whether in a district court or an appellate court, they will 
not recognize you and they will not accept your pleadings. 
You must find someone who is licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
I'm going to ask my bailiff to give a copy of that 
writ that I'm issuing now to Mr. Granados. The record will 
reflect he has received a copy of it. That writ instructs 
you to vacate the home within three days. If you are not 
out of the house in three days I'll issue an order for the 
sheriffs to remove.you. 
Anything else, Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: Was the judgment to your 
satisfaction? 
THE JUDGE: It is. It's been, it's been executed 
as well. 
MR. PRICE: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else, Mr. Price? 
DflflT? O 
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MR. PRICE: No. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's the order of the court. 
BAILIFF: All rise, 
THE JUDGE: Your motion is granted. You're 
released. 
MR* JEFFS: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Did you give me an order earlier? 
(Short inaudible, away from mic). 
All right. At this point I've 
stricken the trial date so actually you1re able to a, 
withdraw by way of notice. 
MR. JEFFS: Fine with me. 
Don't you agreee, Mr. Price? 
Oh, yes. Absolutely. 







MR. JEFFS: Thank you. 
WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded. 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(December 23, 2008) 
THE JUDGE: Please be seated- I'm going to call 
the matter of DFI Properties versus GR 2 Enterprises, case 
080103867. 
Counsel, if you'll state you appearances. 
MR, NADESAN: Defendant present. 
MR. PRICE: Thomas Price on behalf of 
DFI Properties, 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. I appreciate you coming a 
little bit early today. As Mr, Nadesan knows I just 
finished my calendar a few minutes ago from this morning. 
But we1re not recording. 
THE CLERK: (Short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: All right. I111 state again for the 
record, for the recording, this is case 080103867. Counsel 
have made their appearances. 
We're here on defendant's motion for a stay and 
for a, to set aside the judgment the court previously 
entered. I have reviewed your pleadings including one that 
was faxed to the court a, just yesterday evening, I believe, 
and I've reviewed all of that. Am prepared to hear your 
arguments. You may proceed. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. NADESAN 
MR. NADESAN: Your Honor, first I'd like to say I 
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appreciate the fact that you scheduled this hearing on such 
short notice. I know you have a busy schedule. So I thank 
you for that. 
The reason why I filed the motion, Your Honor, is 
because I believe that the Rule 11 was not followed, the 
procedures specified by Rule 11 were not followed at the 
previous hearing. I believe that was because of the haste 
of the situation. 
From my understanding, since I just started the 
case, my client filed a petition to remove to the Nato Nation 
Indian Tribal court. 
THE JUDGE: Well, do you have those pleadings, 
copies of them? 
MR. NADESAN: I have just received them, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Today? 
MR, NADESAN: From my client just a couple days 
ago. I have not had a chance to fully review them. 
THE JUDGE: Well, the reason I asked is because 
a, that's really not what they are. At least from the face 
of the documents. 
One of them is an order staying proceedings. 
It's an order purported to be from the First Federal District 
Court of the Western Region, whatever that is. But it 
purports to order my case, this case here and the case in 
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California stayed, and sets an order to show cause hearing 
for the same day as, as my hearing, I believe. Let1s see. 
No. Oh, for the first of a, the trial that I had set, 
although it indicated that the place and the time would be 
later indicated. 
I believe the petition was a copy of the petition 
that Mr. Granados ostensibly filed, at least that's what it 
appears to me to be, in the a, First Federal District Court 
Western Region. 
MR. NADESAN: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: So I, I don't think it's a, I didn't 
see anything asking for removal. 
MR. NADESAN: Your Honor, and I believe that's 
because Mr. Granados is not an attorney. I believe what 
happened was that he was relying on the advice of Henry 
Clayton from the First Federal Court who told him what 
the procedure was for moving to Indian court. I don't 
believe he actually knew what he was filing. I believe he 
was just following the forms that were given to him. And so 
I believe that what it was was a poorly executed removal in 
the same way that, you know, if we moved to federal court 
you would usually enter an order saying the stay of 
proceedings, or notifying the court that it needs to stay 
proceedings pending the disposition in federal court. 
However, what I think is, is apparent though is 
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that it was not an attempt to defy the court's authority 
because when the court held its hearing the next day 
Mr. Granados showed up, I would, I would believe that if 
Mr. Granados was denying the courts authority he would have 
said well, the court no longer has. jurisdiction, I.1 in" not 
going to show up, I'm not going to, I'm not going to vacate 
and obey. Which he did, he vacated.the premises, he obeyed 
the court's order to vacate. And he's filed a motion to 
set aside. So I do not believe that Mr. Granados believed 
that he was defying the court. 
I believe that he was following poor advice, 
granted, from a non-lawyer. Because from the Nato Indian 
Nation Versus Utah case it's apparently that Mr. Clayton is 
not a lawyer and he should not have done that. 
I think an additional problem is, is that 
Mr. Granados could not act for GR 2 Enterprises because he's 
not an attorney. And so the pleading, petition itself should 
probably be struck from the record as being legally 
nonsignificant because Mr. Granados cannot act for GR 2 
within this court. 
THE JUDGE: Do you know why those documents 
haven't been withdrawn? 
MR. NADESAN: Your Honor, I apologize, but I, I 
would be happy to withdraw those documents. The only reason 
why they haven't been withdrawn was because I wanted to hear 
DAriT? £ 
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the motion to set aside the judgment and see if Your Honor 
wanted to continue with the case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. NADESAN: But we would be happy to withdraw 
those documents, 
THE JUDGE: All right. Any other arguments you 
want? 
MR. NADESAN: Since you're aware of the pleadings 
I feel it's probably a waste of the court's time if I go 
through the arguments that I've laid out in the pleadings. 
If you have any particular questions I'd be happy to answer 
them but-— 
THE JUDGE: I don't. You'll have some time after 
we hear from Mr. Price. 
MR. NADESAN: Thank you, Your Honor 
ARGUMENT BY MR. PRICE 
MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
First, DFI would also like to a, recognize the 
court's indulgence in having this hearing done so quickly. 
We do appreciate it. We'd like to get this matter 
resolved as quickly as possible so we can continue with our 
business. 
First we feel that a, GR 2 has failed to meet the 
a, standard of Rule 60. Rule 60(b) is about getting relief 
from an order of a judgment and it enumerates certain 
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situations in which the judgment can be set aside. GR 2 
does not a, assert any of the, any of the first five. 
It relies upon 6 that reads, 
Any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
And as we have briefed, as DFI briefed, Your Honor, 
that is a pretty high standard for unusual circumstances in 
order to set this judgment aside. 
What Rule 60 does not allow is for a second bite 
of the apple, for a chance to have another a hearing or an 
appeal or to make the arguments. That's what an appellate 
process is for. We feel that a, GR 2 is, is* basically 
making a new argument over what was decided last time we 
met. In fact, it was ill prepared, hasn't really looked at 
the a, at the pleadings. We think that a, GR 2 has failed 
to meet that burden. 
The case I recited was quote, should be 60(b), in 
this, in the a, most recent amended version of the Rule (6) 
should be very cautiously and sparingly 
invoked by the court only in unusual and 
exceptional instances. 
And we don't think we have risen to the level of, 
of that, Your Honor, of unusual and exceptional instances. 
In the event that the court is considering it we 
would like to address some of the arguments that I, just 
i VII-I r* 
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briefly. 
There was, the context of this matter as the court 
knows was an expedited situation pursuant to the statute at 
the court's discretion, we were unlawful detainer status 
because of GR 2's refusal to leave the home. That's where we 
found ourselves. It was also— 
THE JUDGE: An opportunity which I gave GR 2 — 
MR. PRICE: Exactly, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: — to express— 
MR. PRICE: Upon their motion they were trying 
to leave, we had an expedited telephone conference where he 
had an opportunity to leave and failed to do so. And so 
a,— 
THE JUDGE: Well, really twice. Because the 
first time that option was placed on the table was here in 
this courtroom, I asked right then, in fact I think we took 
a recess, 10 or 15, maybe even 20 minutes so that Mr. Rivers 
could go consult with Mr. Granados in the hall and see if he 
wanted to vacate the home. Whereupon, as I explained to the 
parties, that would release me from the 60 day trial rule,, 
which while you may think it's discretionary I don't think 
the legislative language... 
This happens to be a law where I actually 
personally listened to the debates at the senate on this 
bill, on the bill that became law. Their intention really 
PAGR Q 
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is, and one of the issues that was actually brought up, it 
was quite interesting, is they said well, you know, this 
might be an okay situation for an apartment, you know, $500 
a month apartment. But we don't think- this should apply to 
more expensive properties and commercial properties. There 
was a very big concern that you might have a multimillion 
dollar business in a multimillion dollar building and you 
have to have a trial in 60 days. And the senate basically 
said we don't care, we1re setting it as a hard and fast 
deadline. 
And so the only discretion Ir ve seen in the 
statute is that it's subject to the availability of my 
calendar- But since I did have two days open within the 
60 day period I didn't think I had discretion. Obviously a 
constitutional right to a jury trial by a criminal defendant 
would trump the statutory, and I think the statute actually 
makes, makes way for that. 
I just wanted to make that point, especially if 
we1re going to have an .appellate review, I read the statute 
as mandating a trial within 60 days. 
MR. PRICE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Duly 
noted. 
And, and we, DFI Properties tried to a, to help in 
any way that it could as far as meeting with the 
teleconferences and, and trying to agree to get a, when 
r» >v *~*T* < r\ 
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Mr. Granado agreed to, to leave. 
But the bottom line is that a, on December 9th 
when it was, and counsel for Mr. Granados for GR 2 notified 
the court we were less than 10 days away from trial and so 
any, any longer time for the notice would have been unduly 
prejudicial to, to my client as we were trying to prepare for 
a, for trial. 
GR 2 also makes issue over there was no written 
order by the court pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3). As I read 
11(3)(c), Your Honor, there needs to be a statement by the 
court. It doesn't say that it needs to be a written 
order. And a review of the, of the record shows the court 
did meet that standard and Rule 11(c)(3). 
Pursuant to the notice that is provided in the 
Rule 11 we argue, Your Honor, that Mr. Granados and GR 2 did 
have an opportunity to respond. There was a, their counsel, 
Mr. Jeffs'was in the area sitting in the gallery and 
available. The court had a not granted his motion to 
withdraw. 
THE .JUDGE: I expressly denied it prior to that 
point. 
MR. PRICE: Yes, Your Honor. And Mr., oh, I 
forget his name. 
THE JUDGE: The attorney? 
MR. PRICE: Mr. Clayton.was also in the 
T M i •iin i i 
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gallery. I don't know if he is currently a, an attorney-
He represented himself to me as a judge. I don't know if 
that was the person that Mr. Granados represented he was 
taking advice from. But there was certainly ample 
opportunity here to have counsel, and he had a day to find 
someone, an attorney here in Utah County or Salt Lake County 
or Davis County or somewhere in Utah where they could 
represent or at least make an appearance and ask for a, an 
extension if necessary for the hearing. He chose not to. 
Also, we have briefed there is a, a standard for 
pro se litigants here in Utah. In the Nelson case that's 
in our brief it states that, 
A party who represents himself will be 
held to the same knowledge and practice 
as any qualified member of the Bar. 
There's no sliding scale. If you're pro se 
versus a 20 year practitioner or, or a five year 
practitioner it's the same. There are some indulgences 
clearly for pro se litigants. Perhaps they lead their 
witnesses, perhaps they are not sure with the, the caption or 
how it should look, those indulgences should be made to 
pro se litigants.. But filing something that defies the 
courts authority, that is sanctionable, certainly should not 
be forgiven because hey, I made a mistake. And therefs case 
law on that that pursuant to the pro se not being allowed to, 
Dam? 1 o 
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to get away with that. 
As far as the sanction goes, it's clear that the a, 
the sanctions were appropriate. It is in Rule 11 up to the 
court's discretion pursuant to the context of the 
sanctionable conduct to levy sanctions. 
THE JUDGE: Well, you would admit that so far as 
Utah precedent is concerned a, there does not appear to be a 
well established precedent for a dismissal as a sanction? 
MR. PRICE: That's correct, Your Honor. Trust me, 
I have looked high and low for a case and I have been unable 
to find one. • ' • • 
THE JUDGE: Either way. 
MR. PRICE: Either way, that's true. Yes. And 
then there's, under the rules I, if I could find, if I did 
find a case that was against me I clearly would bring that to 
the court. 
A monetary sanction, Your Honor, by this court in 
this situation I'm not sure would dp what it was intended, 
what Rule 11 is intended to do. Let's say hypothetically 
that this court was to give a monetary sanction. Against 
whom? Mr. Granados is obviously in financial dire straits 
and we would just have an empty judgment to pursue . 
Moreover, in Rule 11(c)(2). No. I'm sorry. 
It talks about deferring, oh, here it is, yes, (c)(2), 
A sanction imposed for violation of 
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this rule shall be limited to what is 
sufficient to deter repetition of such 
conduct or comparable conduct by others 
similarly situated. 
Based upon that phraseology, Your Honor, the 
court was right on point according to DFI. We don't want to 
have the courts of this land, the state courts, federal 
courts, being supplanted by these fantasy courts that just 
pop up. 
When a, counsel represented that Mr. Granados 
really didn't believe and wasn't really trying to defy this 
court's order, I find that hard to believe- Because on 
December 16th it is my understanding that Mr. Granados did 
appear down in Sanpete County before this supposed judge and 
there was a hearing. I haven't heard the results of it but 
he went. The hearing was conducted. So any 
representation that Mr. Granados, you know, learned his 
lesson or wasn't really sure what to do, I find lacks 
credibility. And a, this thing should, should remain 
intact. 
Just in summary, Your Honor, just really quickly, 
GR 2 fails to meet the standard of Rule 60(b). They want 
another bite of the apple instead of trying to show 
something that, that was new, something that wasn't 
reasonably foreseeable or reasonably discoverable at the, 
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at the original time that the, the court took issue with the 
conduct. It's inappropriate to retry or try to appeal the 
court's ruling. That's not the purpose of Rule 60(b). 
And a, lastly, the court did meet the standards of 
notice, of an opportunity for GR 2 to respond. And the, the 
sanctions were appropriate. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. NADESAN 
MR. NADESAN: Your Honor, first of all, 
Your Honor, Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate for these 
circumstances. What counsel for DFI is pointing to are 
cases where people are trying to have an appeal because they 
have missed the deadline for filing an appeal, and then file 
a motion to set aside judgment. I have cited several cases 
in my brief where, I believe there's was one where there was 
a double recovery. The court said yes, the motion to set 
aside would have been appropriate under Rule 60(b). 
However, it was inappropriate at that time because they 
waited six months before filing their motion so they lost 
both their chance for appeal and then were trying to have 
their appeal in trial court. 
Here we're not appealing the, the Rule 11 hearing. 
We!re saying that the Rule 11 hearing should not have 
occurred the way it occurred becciuse certain procedures 
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under Rule 11 were not met. This i s — 
THE JUDGE: You're also claiming that. I don't 
really have the power under Rule 11 to dismiss. 
MR. NADESAN: I don't believe that's the case. 
Your Honor. I'm not sure but I don't believe that's the 
case— . 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. NADESAN: .— that you have that power. 
Then the next thing is DFI claims that GR 2 — 
THE JUDGE: And by the way, I'm not affronted by 
anybody telling me that their reading of the law I do or 
don't have certain powers so. I might not agree but 
I'm certainly not offended by your advocating for your 
client. 
MR. NADESAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The second point is that GR 2 a, really did not 
have an opportunity to address the issue. Certainly their, 
GR 2's lawyer was here but he was sitting in the gallery and 
Mr. Granados was asked to respond. . However, Mr. Granados 
does not represent GR 2, he can't represent GR 2 in court. 
So he, he can positively answer for why he acted in the way 
he did, but he can't respond or have any a, bearing on an 
argument for GR 2 in a Rule 11 hearing because he cannot 
represent GR 2. 
Mr. Clayton has never entered an appearance as an 
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attorney, so even if he is an attorney nothing Mr. Clayton . 
could do would do so. 
In this case Mr, Jeffs had set, told GR 2 that he 
wanted to withdraw from the case, Mr. Granados naturally 
felt that his attorney, he didn't have an attorney because 
one, had certain suspicions about the attorney's 
representation, I'm sure Mr. Jeffs would have done a great 
job, but obviously he felt Mr, Jeffs was not going to 
represent him properly in trial or court because Mr, Jeffs 
wanted to withdraw from the case. In this case he did 
not have an opportunity to find another a lawyer to show 
up at the hearing and to represent him at that hearing. So 
in essence GR 2 never spoke or said anything at that 
hearing, 
DFI, when I filed this motion I filed a motion for, 
an ex parte motion for expedited briefing. DFI, counsel for 
DFI called up in this.court and left a message with the court 
reporter, called me up and said we want to have an 
opportunity to respond to your brief. So you filed the 
motion on Monday, the earliest we can respond is by Friday. 
This is on a motion to set aside, not a motion to dismiss the 
case. 
Clearly a single day's notice even on an expedited 
basis is not sufficient. And certainly— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I don't know what happened 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
between the parties. But I saw the ex parte motion for 
expedited briefing on the 17th of December and immediately 
issued a ruling and I gave a, I believe, let me see. Yes. 
I gave counsel for plaintiff basically a day to respond. 
Now, he obviously may have already received it and it may 
have been in the works. 
I think I should point out that my, at least from 
my ruling that's all I gave them as well was a day. 
MR. NADESAN: I understand, Your Honor. But he 
had a day in which to file it, to file a response. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. NADESAN: In this case GR 2 didn't even have 
an opportunity to file a response. The next day it had to 
attend a hearing and respond. And at the hearing there was 
no counsel for GR 2 because his counsel, I know that you 
didn't allow Mr. Jeffs to withdraw until after the hearing, 
but Mr. Jeffs was allowed the opportunity to go to the 
gallery and sit down. Which he probably shouldn't have 
done, he should have probably said I'm still representing 
GR 2, I have to respond on behalf of GR 2 because 
Mr. Grariados cannot. But in this, case there was no response 
from, from GR 2 because Mr. Granados's response does not 
represent the company. 
The next i s — 
THE JUDGE: Although he, he is the primary 
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principal of GR 2. 
MR, NADESAN: He is the primary principal but 
he's not allowed to represent GR 2 in court. And so for 
him to respond would, would be a nullity because just the 
same way Mr- Granados cannot file any pleadings on behalf 
of GR 2, he would not be able to argue at this hearing on 
behalf of GR 2, he doesn't have the ability to answer at a 
Rule 11 hearing on behalf of GR 2 because GR 2 actually was 
still a represented party, and his attorney is the only 
person who could respond on behalf of GR 2 in that 
situation. 
The next point is in terms of the order itself, 
I think If ve made my argument already and I think you 
understand about the, the sanction. I believe that the 
Utah Supreme Court has said the normal sanction are 
attorney's fees. 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
MR, NADESAN: I have never seen anything 
certainly within Utah that says that a court could dismiss 
sua sponte on the.basis of a Rule 11 violation. It talks 
about nonmonetary directives, which I assume would be an 
admonishment to an attorney, etcetera. But I've never 
seen a court dismissing it. 
In the context of Rule 37 the court certainly has 
the power to dismiss the case. And the cases I've-cited 
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where the court has done that it's been within its 
discretion but it's always b£en in cases of egregious 
behavior where parties have continually missed discovery, 
where they have ignored discovery orders compelling 
discovery to be produced, where they have absolutely defied 
the court's a, authority. Here the client has still done 
so. 
And I know that, that DFI claims that the First 
Court of the West or First Federal Court of the West is an 
imaginary court, it's a fantasy court. Quite frankly, 
Your Honor, I'm not an expert on Indian law, I don't know if 
it is or isn't. And the reason why I say that is because 
the 10th Circuit ruling on Nato Indian Nation versus Utah 
says this is not a court that's recognized by the BIA, 
Bureau of Indian affairs. However, another case I cited 
that's included in the reply memo it says that that doesn't 
necessarily mean that an Indian tribe doesn't have any 
authority whatsoever. It says that it might still have 
treaties that are not statutory within the federal 
government but are between treaties of federal government. 
I simply don't— 
THE JUDGE: Do you think they would have the 
power to have an Indian court under those circumstances 
order a stay in a case? 
MR. NADESAN: Absolutely not, Your Honor. I think 
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that there can never be, I think that the only court that can 
order a stay of this court is the federal government, the 
federal court. 
THE JUDGE: Or our appellate courts. 
MR. NADESAN: Or our appellate courts, that's 
correct. 
But I believe that what Mr. Granados was trying 
to do was an action of comity. I believe that, you know, if 
an, if the state court in California had been dealing with 
this same issue it could possibly have, have sent a petition 
to you asking you to stay the proceeding here pending the 
resolution in California if that was the better venue. I 
believe that was Mr. Granados's intention. I don't 
believe that his intention was to defy the court to say that 
you don't have authority or that to order you to stop 
because quite frankly, he attended the next day. If he had 
wanted to do that he would have, simply said well now you .no 
longer have authority, I'll do that. Instead he's 
proceeding as though there are two jurisdictions involved 
that are having concurrent proceedings. And quite frankly, 
if he gets any sort of judgment in the First Court of the 
Federal he's still going to have to come to the Utah court to 
have the judgment recognized, and clearly at that point the 
Utah court will have to decide. Because I don't believe 
during the Rule 11 proceedings the court decided that a, Nato 
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Nation court was, had no authority whatsoever. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, actually on the contrary. If 
that wasn't clear on what I said, that's what I meant to 
say, 
MR. NADESAN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: I did indicate to the parties that 
not only had I found the 10th Circuit case but I had 
conducted additional research such as, and this only took a 
matter of minutes, I went, one of the questions in my mind 
was just because the 10th Circuit handed, hands down a 
ruling saying that it's not on the list of, of recognized 
tribes a, by the federal government as of that date, doesn't 
necessarily mean that they didn't recognize them in the 
meantime. So I thought it was important that I verify 
whether that tribe was recognized. 
And so I went to the BIA list the day of the 
hearing just minutes prior to it to make sure that in the 
intervening time to my surprise they hadn't, you know, maybe 
they had been recognized. But I verified that they had 
not. ' 
And so I expressly stated the fact that I had done 
that search and did not recognize the authority of, of the 
tribe or more importantly of this court. 
MR. NADESAN: I understand, Your Honor. But I 
think the, the secondary issue is if a court is not 
l r*T*-l *"* *"* 
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recognized by the BIA does that necessarily, does it 
necessarily mean if a tribe is not recognized by the BIA does 
that necessarily mean that the tribe1s court has no powers 
whatsoever. . 
THE. JUDGE: I wasn't looking at what powers they 
might have, if they have a reservation or something. 
Specifically what I was looking at was an order telling me 
that my case was stayed. 
MR. NADESAN: And, Your Honor, again I note that 
Mr. Granados has filed the order but he certainly didn't 
sign the order saying that. He was told by someone, I 
assume Judge Clayton or another officer of the Nato Nation, 
that this was the procedure that he needed to follow. 
Certainly if Mr. Granados had filed an order telling the 
court to stop its proceedings then that would certainly be 
sanctionable. But here he was told. And he should have, 
Ifm not quite sure what he should have done at that point. 
Maybe he should have done research into whether a, an Indian 
nation that's unrecognized by the BIA should file this or 
what the correct procedure for filing it is. I believe 
that under the pro se rule I believe there's a lot of leeway 
given to pro se litigants in terms of procedure- And In 
this case he shouldn't have filed that procedure. What he 
should have done was filed a proposed order or something of 
that nature in terms of what he filed. 
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But certainly I think that, that he never intended 
that this be something saying that the court must stop. In 
which case again, I think the strongest evidence that he 
didn't believe that was that he would not have shown up the 
next day. I believe what he was asking to do was on the 
basis of comity in a concurrent proceeding for the court to 
stay its proceedings until that had stopped. 
Clearly the, the advice he received and the papers, 
the petition he received from, the order he received from 
Judge Clayton was incorrect, it shouldn't have been filed. 
If he had given that to his lawyer who was the true 
representative of GR 2, his lawyer most likely would have 
said well, let me investigate this and let me.look at the 
correct procedure, you can't file this yourself because you 
can't represent GR 2, I would need to file this, I believe 
that's what should have occurred. 
And so when Mr. Granados went ahead and filed it 
he wasn't following correct procedure and he was filing 
papers that belonged to the court to, that were given to him 
by Judge Clayton that he was unable to determine being a 
layman whether they were the correct papers or not, to file 
under the circumstances.. 
So that, that's my point, Your Honor- Not that I 
believe that the court has the, the Indian court has, you 
know, status or can order you to stop. I don't believe any 
T*7\ /^m *"> ^  
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court can order you to stop except for, you know, a federal 
court or an appellate court. I believe that other courts 
can ask you to give them comity and allow, and stay your 
proceedings/ And I believe that the correct way would be to 
file a petition with a proposed order staying, I believe 
that's what should have been sent to you should have been a 
proposed order. 
I believe that there are Indian cases where, you 
know, under the Indian Child Welfcire Act or for crimes 
committed on a reservation where sole jurisdiction lies with 
an Indian court- I don't know since I have, I'm not an 
Indian law expert and I know we're not here to argue the 
Rule 11, whether a Rule 11 violation occurred or not. I 
believe that if you wanted to do that both sides should have 
an opportunity to brief that issue-
But I am saying that it's unclear from my look, 
cursory glance through Utah law whether an unrecognized 
tribe has any sort of jurisdiction or not. And I think 
that that issue needs to be looked at least to properly 
identify whether this is a Rule 11 violation or not. 
But I think on its face given that Mr. Granados is 
a layman, given that there are certain circumstances where an 
Indian court does have jurisdiction, and given that there is 
nothing on the internet certainly that a layman could find 
saying that an Indian court, an unrecognized Indian tribe 
pa^w ot; 
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doesn't have any authority whatsoever, jurisdiction 
whatsoever, I believe that he, it was ostensibly reasonable 
for him to file that. 
I believe that especially given that he has no 
knowledge of procedure within the court that, and as a layman 
he had no idea. I think the correct circumstance he should 
have given it to his lawyer and his lawyer should have 
determined whether it should be filed. And I don't think 
that he had the right to. file it on behalf of GR 2., 
Now, DFI also talked about the order, about the 
sanction. At the hearing, Your Honor, you never considered 
monetary sanctions, you never considered any other type of 
sanction or award agaiaist my client. From my recollection 
of the transcript you told, you asked a, the counsel for 
DFI what he thought should be done. Counsel for DFI said I 
think you should strike their answer and counterclaim and 
enter a default judgment- And then you chose to do so. 
On the record you didn't identify why you thought that 
particular sanction versus striking the petition, 
admonishing Mr. Granados, giving him a warning that if he 
does that kind of behavior again you would dismiss the case, 
why any of those other less harsh sanctions were not, were 
not chosen versus the sanction of dismissal. Certainly 
dismissal is a very harsh sanction. " And I think that there 
needs to be some sort of reasoning and basis. And certainly 
T>AOJ? o& 
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you can correct that now if you want about providing such a 
basis. But I believe that there, that the goal of 
preventing such a recurrence could have been just as easily 
and well accomplished by admonishing Mr. Granado that he 
cannot file a pleading on this court on behalf of 
GR 2 Enterprises, that if he does that you're going to 
strike the pleading, and that if he does so again you'd find 
him in contempt of court. Certainly that seems just as a 
workable solution as dismissing GEJ 2 Enterprises's case. 
Especially that Mr. Granados cannot represent GR 2. 
And a, I believe that's all I had in response to 
DFI. Do you have any questions? 
THE JUDGE: I don't have any questions. 
MR. NADESAN: Thank you 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: I appreciate your arguments. 
I am fully cognizant of a couple of facts. 
Number one, I'm cognizant of the lack of Utah precedent on 
dismissal as a sanction under Rule 11. I'm also cognizant 
that this.to me at least is an extraordinary case for a 
couple of reasons. I'm going to, Ifm going to address them 
in turn. 
I'm going to deny the motion for a stay. Number 
one, because I don't think there's a reason to stay. And 
number two, for the stated purposes because the, the home was 
Dnrc *w 
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vacated I don't think the matter is as pressing as it once 
was. 
On the Rule 60(b) motion I'm going to deny that as 
well. 
If you take the Nato Indian tribe and stick that 
into Google, one of the first things that comes up is the 
10th Circuit decision. So I really believe that Mr. Granados 
could have a, found that with fairly easy access. 
But I think it is important for me to state on the 
record why I'm denying the motion and why I believe these 
particular circumstances warrant the sanction which the court 
handed down. The sanction was not handed down without a, 
considering a lesser Scinction. 
The fact of the matter was these pleadings as such 
were filed really on the eve of trial right at, while it 
wasn't a day or two days prior to trial, we were all 
cognizant of the fact that we're on a very expedited basis. 
And there was no doubt given the complexity that had been 
expressed by the parties as to the history of this case 
that substantial time and money would be incurred by all of 
the parties, but DFI in particular, in preparing for the 
trial. 
I think there are three critical points. In 
prior hearings on this matter it was represented to the court 
that the present matter arose out of a transaction in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
California, and I assume that's the case that the order from 
the Nato Indian tribe was attempting to stay as well. 
In that case it was represented to the court by 
proffer that in an initial attempt to avoid foreclosure that 
Mr. Granados had a, deeded away fractional interests in his 
property and that then serially one after another a each of 
those fractional interests declared bankruptcy in the State 
of California in an attempt to delay the foreclosure action 
until the bankruptcy court in California a, put an order 
barring any future petitions for bankruptcy by any of the 
fractional interests. 
The fact of the matter is is up until Mr. Granados 
filed the documents that he did in this case I actually 
didn't have an evidentiary basis. That was a proffer by 
DRI. But I didn't have any evidence that Mr, Granados had in 
fact deeded fractional interests. Maybe true, maybe not. 
However/ Mr. Granados in a, in the pleadings that he filed 
I believe substantiated that. Or maybe, isn't it.... Let 
me see. I know he did. I'm trying to look where it 
happened. 
Was there an affidavit, affidavit filed by 
Mr. Granados somewhere along the line here? 
MR. PRICE: Your-Honor, if I may address that 
question. 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
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MR. PRICE: There was an affidavit but it was 
filed with the federal bankruptcy court. It has the caption 
of the California court. It was not filed with these 
Nato— 
THE JUDGE: Well, my point is is it in the 
record? 
Well, I do have in the record a, the order of the 
bankruptcy court showing the fractional interests, 16 
undivided l/8th interests. I can't get my fingertips on 
it. In any event, I have the record from the bankruptcy 
court. 
I believe there's an acknowledgment from 
Mr. Granados in the pleadings about the fact that those a, 
l/8th interests were in fact granted. Although I believe 
what he says is, is he was mistaken in following someone 
else's advice, much like the present circumstances, that that 
would lead to somk sort of help on the a, foreclosure. 
My point being is that prior to the.filing of the 
Nato Indian purported pleadings I have before me a 
circumstance where it already appeared that GR 2 was being 
devious is a good word, in trying to avoid the foreclosure. 
So that's, that's really factor number one. 
Factor two is the timeliness. That's really 
what makes this case extraordinary. Here I have a 
legislative mandate specifically as to holdovers or those in 
D A nx? i r\ 
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a, the circumstances like the present one where a party is 
staying in possession of the premises and that is really 
what triggers the expedited hearing. What the legislature 
was getting at is that's paramount apparently to them. 
They have said that it is public policy that if we have 
someone staying over we1re going to have the trial in a 
matter of, of 60 days. When these finally got filed and we 
had our hearing we were basically a week out from having our 
trial. And Mr. Granados admitted in open court that the 
reason that he, he did it is he said I didn't feel like I had 
a choice. But he essentially was trying to derail this 
court1s ability to follow a legislative mandate and have that 
trial within 60 days.-
So in considering a lesser sanction this court 
looked at the fact that if I awarded attorney's fees or an 
admonition or did- anything else, that would not cure the 
significant problem that we had that a trial needed to moye> (Jl^ 
forward in a number of days. .^: 
The court found it especially egregious that itirL . .. 
appears that the specific purpose of filing the order 
attempting to stay this case was to derail a trial which had 
been set. 
While I did take into account that I'm dealing 
with a pro se litigant, when it comes to a just and 
orderly presentation of matters in the state courts if a 
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pro se litigant undertakes activities which undermine the 
system I believe that a much more harsher sanction is a, 
required. 
Now, the counsel for GR 2 was not released until 
after the hearing on the sanction, and Mr. Granados as the 
principal of GR 2 wanted Mr. Rivers to respond, or if 
Mr, Rivers had thought it was appropriate they were given 
that a, opportunity. 
I also believe that it was within the inherent 
power of this court to order a dismissal under these 
circumstances. In the case of Wilde versus RJ Reynolds 
Industries, 709 F.2d 585 the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
indicated that, 
If a party engages in conduct utterly 
inconsistent with the orderly 
administration of justice, that dismissal 
simply under the inherent powers of the 
court may be the appropriate sanction. 
And I believe that same thinking applies here. 
I would also note that the 9th Circuit in 
Hutchinson versus Hensley Flying Service, it doesn't appear 
that it's a published case, the citation I have is 2000 U.S. 
Lexus 402, indicating that dismissal is an allowable 
sanction under Rule 11. In that case the court looked to an 
8th Circuit opinion Carmen versus Treat 7 F.3d 1379 from 1993 
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from the 8th Circuit also indicating that dismissal is a 
possible sanction. 
So in totality I will freely admit and acknowledge 
that this, these are exceptional circumstances, and that 
typically, if this had been a case where we were months out 
from trial I would have looked to a lesser sanction. But 
given the timing of this case and the what I believe blatant 
attempt there was here to derail a trial setting, I'm going 
to stick with the ruling that I made. 
Mr, Price, will you prepare an order? 
MR. PRICE: Yes, I will. Thank you, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else from the parties?. 
(No recorded response) 
WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded. 
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